The 1954 Guatemalan coup was a covert operation carried out by the Central Intelligence Agency (US CIA) that ousted democratically elected Guatemalan President Jacobo ÃÆ' rbenz and ended the 1944-1954 Guatemalan Revolution. Under the code name PBSUCCESS operation , it installs the military dictatorship of Carlos Castillo Armas, the first in a series of US-backed authoritarian rulers in Guatemala.
The Guatemalan revolution began in 1944, when the popular uprising overthrew the authoritarian Jorge Ubico and brought Juan Josà © à © valo into power through Guatemala's first democratic election. The new president introduced a nearly universal minimum wage and suffrage, aimed at turning Guatemala into a liberal democracy. ArÃÆ'Ã… © valo was replaced by ÃÆ' rbenz in 1951, which instituted popular land reforms that provided property to landless farmers. The Guatemalan Revolution was disliked by the United States government, which was tended by the Cold War to see it as communist. This perception grew after ÃÆ' rbenz took power and legalized the Communist Party. The United Fruit Company (UFC), whose highly profitable business has been affected by the end of exploitative work practices in Guatemala, is engaged in an influential lobbying campaign to persuade the US to overthrow the Guatemalan government. US President Harry Truman authorized Operation PBFORTUNE to overthrow ÃÆ' rbenz in 1952; although the operation was quickly canceled, it was the precursor to PBSUCCESS.
Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected President of the United States in 1952, promising to take a hard line against communism; links whose staff John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles have to UFC also make them more likely to act against the Guatemalan government. In addition, the US government draws an exaggerated conclusion about the extent of communist influence from the presence of a small number of communists among advisors ÃÆ' rbenz. Eisenhower authorized the CIA to carry out PBSUCCESS Operations in August 1953. The CIA armed, funded, and trained a force of 480 people led by Carlos Castillo Armas. The coup was preceded by US efforts to criticize and isolate Guatemala internationally. Castillo Armas's forces invaded Guatemala on June 18, 1954, supported by a heavy psychological war campaign. These include radio stations that broadcast anti-government propaganda and a version of military events that favor rebellion, claiming as genuine news, as well as the bombing of Guatemala City and the Guatemalan sea blockade. The invasion forces were badly military, and most of the attacks were defeated. However, psychological warfare and possible US invasion intimidated Guatemalan soldiers, who eventually refused to fight. ÃÆ' rbenz briefly and unsuccessfully trying to arm civilians against the invasion, before resigning on 27 June. Castillo Armas became president ten days later, after negotiations in San Salvador.
Described as the definitive death blow to democracy in Guatemala, the coup is widely criticized internationally, and contributes to long-lasting anti-US. sentiment in Latin America. Trying to justify the coup, the CIA launched Operation PBHISTORY, which sought evidence of Soviet influence in Guatemala among documents from the era of ÃÆ' rbenz: the attempt failed. Castillo Armas quickly assumed dictatorial powers, banned opposition parties, imprisoned and tortured political opponents, and reversed the social reform of the revolution. Nearly four decades of civil war occurred, when left-wing guerrillas fought against a series of US-backed authoritarian regimes whose brutality included the Mayan genocide.
Video 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état
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Doktrin Monroe
The foreign policy doctrine of US President James Monroe in 1823 warned European powers against further colonization in Latin America. Another purpose of the Monroe Doctrine is to maintain order and stability, and to ensure that US access to resources and markets is unlimited. Historian Mark Gilderhus states that the doctrine also contains a language that is racially derogatory, which likens Latin American countries to debate children. Although the US initially lacked the power to uphold the doctrine, during the 19th century many European powers withdrew from Latin America, allowing the United States to extend its sphere of influence throughout the region. In 1895, President Grover Cleveland made a milder version of the doctrine, stating that the US is "practically sovereign" on the continent.
After the Spanish-American War in 1898, this aggressive interpretation was used to create a US economic empire throughout the Caribbean, as with the 1903 covenant with a very tilted Cuba in the US. ' kind. US President Theodore Roosevelt believes that the US should be the main recipient of production in Central America. The US implemented this hegemony with armed intervention in Nicaragua (1912-33), and Haiti (1915-34). The US does not need to use its military strength in Guatemala, where a number of dictators are willing to accommodate the interests of the US economy in exchange for its support for their regime. Guatemala is one of the countries of Central America in the period known as the banana republic. From 1890 to 1920, control of Guatemala's resources and economy shifted away from Britain and Germany to the United States, which became Guatemala's main trading partner. The Monroe doctrine continues to be seen as relevant to Guatemala, and used to justify a coup d'etat in 1954.
Authoritarian Government and United Fruit Company
After a spike in global coffee demand in the late 19th century, the Guatemalan government made several concessions to plantation owners. It passed a law that deprived the indigenous communal land ownership and allowed the coffee farmers to buy it. Manuel Estrada Cabrera, President of Guatemala from 1898 to 1920, was one of the few rulers who made major concessions to foreign companies, including United Fruit Company (UFC). Formed in 1899 by the merger of two large US corporations, this new entity has a vast land in Central America, and in Guatemala it controls rail, dock, and communication systems. By 1900, the country had become the world's largest exporter of bananas, and had a monopoly over Guatemala's banana trade. Historian William Blum describes the role of UFC in Guatemala as "country within the country". The US government is also closely involved with the Guatemalan state under Cabrera, often dictating financial policy and ensuring that American companies are granted some exclusive rights. When Cabrera was overthrown in 1920, the US sent an armed force to ensure that the new president remained friendly to him.
Concerned by the popular uprising after the riots created by the Great Depression, rich Guatemalan landowners lent support to Jorge Ubico, who won an undeniable election in 1931. The Ubico regime became one of the most repressive in the region. He abolished the debt payable, replacing it with a vagabond law which stipulates that all men who have no working-age land are required to perform at least 100 days of forced labor each year. He authorizes landowners to take whatever action they wish against their workers, including execution. Ubico is an admirer of European fascist leaders such as Benito Mussolini and Adolf Hitler, but must ally with the US for geopolitical reasons, and received great support from this country during his reign. A persistent anti-communist, Ubico reacts to several peasant uprisings with detention and massacre.
By 1930, UFC had built an operating capital of 215 million US dollars, and had been the largest owner of land and employer in Guatemala for several years. Ubico gave him a new contract, which is very profitable for the company. This includes 200,000 hectares (490,000 hectares) of public land, the exemption of all taxes, and the assurance that no other company will accept competing contracts. Ubico asked the UFC to limit the daily wage of its workers to 50 US cents, so that workers in other companies would be less able to demand higher wages.
Guatemala Revolution and the presidency Arà ©  © valo
The repressive policies of the Ubico government resulted in a popular uprising led by middle-class students and citizens in 1944. Ubico fled, handing power to the junta of three men who continued Ubico's policy until it was also overthrown, by the October Revolution aimed at turning Guatemala into a liberal democracy. Free elections followed by a philosophically conservative university professor, Juan JosÃÆ' © Arà ©  © valo, as President of Guatemala. The government of Arà ©  © valo developed a more liberal labor code, built health centers, and increased funding for education. ArÃÆ'  © valo imposes a minimum wage, and creates state-run farms to employ landless workers. He also cracked down on the Communist Party of Guatemala ( Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo , PGT) and in 1945 criminalized all unions in the workplace with less than 500 workers. In 1947, the remaining trade unions have grown strong enough to suppress it in devising new work codes, which make discrimination in the workplace illegal and create health and safety standards. However, Arà ©  © Valo refuses to advocate any land reform, and stop working relationships that change drastically in the countryside.
Despite the anti-communism ArÃÆ' © valo, the US was suspicious of him, and worried that he was under Soviet influence. The communist movement grew stronger during the presidency, partly because he released his imprisoned leaders, and also through the strength of his teacher's union. Another reason for US concern is the support of Arà ©  © valo of the Caribbean Legion. The Legion is a group of progressive revolutionaries and exiles, whose members include Fidel Castro, who aims to overthrow US-backed dictatorships throughout Central America. The government also faces contradictions from within the country; Arà ©  © Valo survived at least 25 coup attempts during his presidency. A noteworthy example is an attempt in 1949 led by Francisco Arana, which was thwarted in an armed shootout between Arana supporters and forces led by defense minister Arà © Ã… © valo, Jacobo ÃÆ' rbenz. Arana was among those killed, but details of the coup attempt were never published. Other sources opposed to the Arles government were right-wing and conservative politicians in the military who had grown strongly during the dictatorship of Ubico, as well as the clerics of the Catholic Church.
Presidency ÃÆ' rbenz and land reform
The free elections of 1950 were won by popular ÃÆ' rbenz, and represented the first transfer of power between democratically elected leaders in Guatemala. ÃÆ' rbenz has a personal relationship with some members of the communist PGT, which was passed during his reign, and several members played a role in drafting a new presidential policy. Nevertheless, ÃÆ' rbenz did not try to turn Guatemala into a communist state, instead choosing a moderate capitalist approach. PGT is also committed to working within the existing legal framework to achieve its immediate objective of freeing farmers from feudalism and increasing workers' rights. The most prominent component of the policy of ÃÆ' rbenz is the agrarian reform bill. ÃÆ' rbenz drafted the bill itself, having sought advice from economists across Latin America. The focus of the legislation is to move unplanted lands from large landowners to poor laborers, who will then be able to start their own decent farming.
The official title of the agrarian reform bill is the Decree 900. It takes over all unplanted land from land ownership greater than 673 hectares (272 ha). If the plantation is between 224 acres (91 ha) and 672 acres (272 ha), unplanted land should be taken over only if less than two thirds of it is used. Owners are compensated with government bonds, which are equivalent to foreclosed lands. The value of the land itself is what the owners have declared in their tax return in 1952. Of the nearly 350,000 private holdings, only 1710 are affected by the takeover. The law was implemented very quickly, resulting in some arbitrary land grabs. There is also some violence, directed at the landowners, as well as on farmers who own smallholdings.
By June 1954, 1.400,000 acres (570,000 ha) of land had been taken over and distributed. About 500,000 people, or one-sixth of the population, have received land at this point. Contrary to predictions made by critics, the law produces a slight increase in Guatemalan agricultural productivity, and in an increase in the area of ​​cultivation. Purchasing of agricultural machinery is also increasing. Overall, the law has resulted in a significant increase in the standard of living for thousands of farm families, of which the majority are indigenous. Historian Greg Grandin sees the law as a representation of a fundamental transition of power favorable to those who have been marginalized.
Maps 1954 Guatemalan coup d'état
Genesis and introduction
United Fruit Company lobbied
In 1950, the annual profit of United Fruit Company was 65 million US dollars, twice that of the Guatemalan government. The company also almost owns Puerto Barrios, the only port of Guatemala to the Atlantic Ocean, allowing it to profit from the flow of goods through the port. Due to its long association with the Ubico government, Guatemalan revolutionaries saw the UFC as a barrier to progressing after 1944. This image is reinforced by the company's discriminatory policies against colored workers. Due to its size, Archeo government reforms more affect UFC than other companies. Among other things, the new labor code allows UFC workers to attack when their demands for higher wages and job security are not met. The company sees itself as a special target by reform, and refuses to negotiate with a number of strikes, although it often violates the new law. Company difficulties worsened by the issuance of Decree No. 900 in 1952. Of the 550,000 hectares (220,000 hectares) owned by the company, only 15 percent are cultivated; the rest are empty, and thus are under the scope of the law of agrarian reform.
UFC responded by intensively lobbying the US government; some members of Congress criticized the Guatemalan government for not protecting the interests of the company. The Guatemalan government responds that the company is a major obstacle to progressing in the country. American historians observe that "[to] the Guatemalans it seems that their country is mercilessly exploited by foreign interests that take great advantage without contributing anything to the welfare of the nation". In 1953, 200,000 acres (81,000 ha) of unreacted land was taken over by the government, offering a corporate compensation at a rate of 2.99 US dollars to acre (7.39 dollars per hectare), twice what it paid company at that time. buying property. More takeovers take place shortly thereafter, bringing the total to over 400,000 acres (160,000 ha); the government offers compensation to the company at the rate at which UFC has assessed its own property for tax purposes. Since this is a very low rating, the company is not happy with compensation, resulting in further lobbying in Washington, in particular through US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who has close ties with the company.
UFC also started a public relations campaign to discredit the Guatemalan government; it was hired by Edward Bernays, who installed an integrated misinformation campaign for several years describing the company as a victim of the communist Guatemalan government. The company increased its efforts after Dwight Eisenhower was elected President of the United States in 1952. This included the assignment of a research study from a company known to be hostile to social reform, resulting in a very critical 235-page report on the Guatemalan government. Historians have claimed that the report is full of "dignitaries, harsh descriptions and strange historical theories" but still has a significant impact on the members of Congress who read them. Overall, the company spent more than half a million dollars to convince members of parliament and the American public that the Guatemalan government needs to be overthrown.
Operation PBFORTUNE
As the Cold War progressed and the Guatemalan government clashed with US companies as more and more problems, the US government became increasingly suspicious of the Guatemalan Revolution. In addition, the Cold War influenced the Truman administration to see the Guatemalan government as communist. Support Arà ©  © valo for the Caribbean Legion is also worried about the Truman administration, which sees it as a vehicle for communism, and not as an anti-dictatorial power that is understood as. Until the end of his reign, the Truman administration relied solely on diplomatic and economic means to try and reduce the perceived communist influence. The US refused to sell arms to the Guatemalan government after 1944; in 1951 began blocking all gun purchases by Guatemala.
The US concern over communist influence increased after the election of ÃÆ' rbenz in 1951 and the enactment of the 900 Decision in 1952. In April 1952 Anastasio Somoza GarcÃÆ'a, the Nicaraguan dictator, made his first state visit to the US He made several public speeches praising the US, and was awarded a medal by government of New York City. During a meeting with Truman and his senior staff, Somoza said that if the US gave him weapons, he would "clean up Guatemala". The proposal did not receive much direct support, but Truman instructed the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to follow up on it. The CIA contacted Carlos Castillo Armas, a Guatemalan army officer who had been exiled from the country in 1949 following a failed coup attempt against President Arà ©  © valo. Believing that Castillo Armas would lead a coup with or without their help, the CIA decided to give him weapons and 225,000 US dollars.
The coup was planned in detail over the next few weeks by the CIA, UFC, and Somoza. The CIA also contacted Marcos PÃÆ' Â © rez JimÃÆ'Â © nez of Venezuela and Rafael Trujillo from the Dominican Republic; two US-backed dictators backed the plan, and agreed to donate some funds. Although PBFORTUNE was officially approved on 9 September 1952, various planning steps were taken early this year. In January 1952, officers at the CIA Planning Directorate compiled a list of "high-ranking Communists desired by the new government to be quickly eliminated in the event of a successful anti-Communist coup". The CIA's plan calls for the killing of more than 58 Guatemalans, as well as the arrest of many others.
The CIA implemented the plan at the end of 1952. A UFC borrowed vessel was specifically installed in New Orleans and loaded with weapons under the guise of agricultural machinery, and sailed to Nicaragua. However, the plan was terminated immediately after: the termination accounts vary. Some sources state that the State Department found the plan when a senior official was asked to sign a particular document, while another claimed that Somoza was unwise. The end result was that Secretary of State Dean Acheson canceled the operation. The CIA continues to support Castillo Armas; it gave him a monthly salary of 3,000 US dollars, and gave him resources to defend his rebel army.
Eisenhower Administration
During his successful US presidential campaign, Dwight Eisenhower pledged to pursue a more proactive anti-communist policy, promising to overthrow communism, rather than arresting him. Working in the atmosphere boosted McCarthyism among governments, Eisenhower was more willing than Truman to use the CIA to overthrow the US government's unwelcome government. Although PBFORTUNE has been rapidly abandoned, tensions between the US and Guatemala continue to increase, especially with the legalization of communist PGT, and inclusion in the government coalition for January 1953 elections. Articles published in the US press often reflect this predisposition to see communist influence; for example, the New York Times article about a visit to Guatemala by Chilean poet Pablo Neruda highlighted his communist beliefs, but did not mention his reputation as the greatest poet living in Latin America.
Several figures in the Eisenhower government, including Foreign Minister John Foster Dulles and his brother CIA Director Allen Dulles, have close ties to the United Fruit Company. Dulles brothers have worked for Sullivan & amp; Cromwell, and in that capacity has arranged several deals for UFC. Deputy Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith will then become the company's director, while UFC's wife of public relations director is Eisenhower's personal assistant. This personal connection meant that the Eisenhower administration tended to compensate UFC's interests with U.S. national security interests, and made it more willing to overthrow the Guatemalan government. The successful operation of the 1953 CIA to oust the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran also reinforced Eisenhower's confidence in using the agent to make political changes abroad.
Historians and writers who wrote of the 1954 coup have debated the importance of the United Fruit Company's role and concerns about communist influence (whether this is based on reality) in the US decision to incite a coup in 1954. Several historians have maintained that UFC lobbying, and its land acquisition , is a major motivation for the US, reinforced by individual financial relations in the Eisenhower administration to the UFC. Others argue that the overthrow is motivated primarily by U.S. strategic interests knowledge of the presence of a small number of communists close to ÃÆ' rbenz led to the US reaching the wrong conclusion about the extent of communist influence. Yet others argue that the overthrow is part of a larger trend in the US to oppose the nationalist movement in the Third World. Both the role of UFC and the perception of communist influence continue to be called the motivation for US action today.
PBSUCCESS operation
Planning
The CIA operation to overthrow Jacobo ÃÆ' rbenz, named Operation PBSUCCESS, was authorized by Eisenhower in August 1953. The operation was given a $ 2.7 million budget for "psychological warfare and political action." The total budget has been estimated between 5 and 7 million dollars, and planning to employ more than 100 CIA agents. In addition, the operation recruited a number of individuals from among the Guatemalan exiles and residents of the surrounding countries. The plan includes compiling a list of people inside the rbenz government to kill if the coup should be carried out. Manuals of killing techniques are compiled, and lists are also made from people who will be thrown out by the junta.
The Department of Foreign Affairs established a team of diplomats who would support PBSUCCESS. It was led by John Peurifoy, who took over as Ambassador to Guatemala in October 1953. Another member of the team was William D. Pawley, a wealthy businessman and diplomat with a broad knowledge of the aviation industry. Peurifoy is an anti-communist militant, and has proven his willingness to work with the CIA during his time as US Ambassador to Greece. Under Peurifoy's rule, relations with the Guatemalan government deteriorate further, although those with the Guatemalan military are improving. In a report to John Dulles, Peurifoy stated that he "certainly believes that if [ÃÆ' rbenz] is not a communist, then he will surely do it until someone comes." Inside the CIA, the operation was led by Deputy Director of Plan Frank Wisner. The field commander chosen by Wisner was former US Army Colonel Albert Haney, then head of the CIA station in South Korea. Haney reports directly to Wisner, thus separating PBSUCCESS from the CIA's Latin American division, a decision that creates tension within the agency. Haney decided to set up a headquarters in a hidden office complex in Opa-locka, Florida. Under the code name "Lincoln", it becomes the operative nerve center of PBSUCCESS.
The CIA's operation was complicated by an early coup on March 29, 1953, with a futile assault on the army's garrison at SalamÃÆ'¡, in the central Guatemalan department of Verapaz. The rebellion was quickly destroyed, and a number of participants were arrested. Several CIA and allied agents were imprisoned, undermining attempted coups. Thus the CIA became more dependent on Guatemalan exile groups and their anti-democratic allies in Guatemala. The CIA considered several candidates to lead the coup. Miguel YdÃÆ'goras Fuentes, a conservative candidate who lost the 1950 election to ÃÆ' rbenz, sided with the Guatemalan opposition but was rejected for his role in the Ubico regime, as well as his appearance in Europe, which was unlikely to attract a mixed majority. population mestizo . Another popular candidate is a coffee planter Juan CÃÆ'³rdova Cerna, who had served in the cabinet Arà ©  © valo before becoming UFC legal counsel. His son's death in the anti-government uprising in 1950 made him oppose the government, and he had planned a failed SalamÃÆ'¡ coup in 1953 before fleeing to join the Castillo Armas in exile. Although his status as a civilian gave him an edge over Castillo Armas, he was diagnosed with throat cancer in 1954, taking him out of his calculations. Therefore Castillo Armas, in exile since the failed 1949 coup and on the CIA payroll since PBFORTUNE was canceled in 1951, will lead the impending coup.
Castillo Armas was given enough money to recruit small army of mercenaries from among Guatemalan exiles and residents of neighboring countries. The band is called the Army of Liberation. The CIA set up training camps in Nicaragua and Honduras and supplied them with weapons as well as some bombers. The military agreement signed by the United States with the two countries before the Guatemalan invasion allowed it to move more heavily freely weapons. This preparation is only superficially covered: the CIA intends to ÃÆ'bbenz to find out about them, as part of its plan to convince the Guatemalan people that the overthrow of ÃÆ' rbenz is a fait accompli . In addition, the CIA made covert contact with a number of church leaders throughout the Guatemalan countryside, and persuaded them to incorporate anti-government messages into their sermons.
Caracas Conference and U.S. propaganda
While preparations for PBSUCCESS Operations are underway, Washington issued a series of statements denouncing the Guatemalan government, alleging that it had been infiltrated by communists. The Department of Foreign Affairs also requested the Organization of American States to modify the agenda of the Inter-American Conference, scheduled to be held in Caracas in March 1954, requesting the addition of an item entitled "International Communist Intervention in the American Republic", widely seen as a move targeting Guatemala. On 29 and 30 January 1954, the Guatemalan government published a document containing information leaked to him by members of the Castillo Armas team who had turned against him. Lacking in the original documents, the government has done a poor falsification to improve its information, damaging the credibility of its allegations. A series of arrests followed the Castillo Armas ally in Guatemala, and the government issued a statement implying "Northern Government" in a plan to overthrow ÃÆ' rbenz. Washington denies these allegations, and US media uniformly takes the side of their government; even publications that have until then provided relatively balanced coverage of Guatemala, such as Christian Science Monitor , suggest that ÃÆ' rbenz has succumbed to communist propaganda. Some members of Congress also point to accusations from the Guatemalan government as evidence that it has become a communist.
At a conference in Caracas, various Latin American governments sought economic aid from the US, as well as ongoing non-intervention in their internal affairs. The goal of the US government is to pass a resolution condemning the spread of communism in the Western Hemisphere. Guatemala's foreign minister Guillermo Toriello strongly opposed the resolution, stating that it represents "the internationalization of McCarthyism". Despite the support among delegates for Toriello's views, the anti-communist resolution passed with only Guatemalan voting opposing, as the dictatorship voice depended on the US and the threat of economic pressure imposed by John Dulles. Although the support among delegates to Dulles's anti-communist shrill is less powerful than he and Eisenhower had hoped for, the conference marked a victory for the United States, capable of making a concrete Latin American view of communism.
The US stopped selling weapons to Guatemala in 1951 when it signed a bilateral defense agreement and increased arms shipments to neighboring Honduras and Nicaragua. The US promised the Guatemalan military that it could also acquire weapons - if ÃÆ' rbenz was ousted. In 1953, the Department of Foreign Affairs exacerbated the US arms embargo by thwarting the purchase of government weapons ÃÆ' rbenz from Canada, Germany and Rhodesia. By 1954 ÃÆ' rbenz had despaired for the weapon, and decided to obtain it secretly from Czechoslovakia, which would be the first time that a Soviet bloc-state sends weapons to America, an act seen as building a communist dump in America. The weapons were sent to Guatemala in the Atlantic port of Puerto Barrios by the Swedish cargo ship MSÃ, Alfhem , which sailed from Szczecin in Poland. The US failed to intercept delivery despite enforcing illegal naval quarantine in Guatemala. But the "Guatemalan army officer" quoted in The New York Times says that "some weapons... are clothing, worn out, or completely wrong to use there". The CIA described the delivery of these weapons as a Soviet interference in the backyard of the United States; it was the last push for the CIA to launch a coup.
US rhetoric abroad also affected the Guatemalan military. The military was always anti-communist, and Ambassador Peurifoy had put a lot of pressure on senior officers since his arrival in Guatemala in October 1953. ÃÆ' rbenz had intended to send a secret weapon from Alfhem to be used to improve the peasants' militia, in terms of infidelity of the army. However, the US informed the army chiefs of the deployment, forcing ÃÆ'bbb to hand it over to the military, and deepening the rift between him and his generals.
Castillo Armas Invasion
Castillo Armas's force of 480 people was divided into four teams, ranging from 60 to 198. On 15 June 1954 these four troops left their bases in Honduras and El Salvador, and gathered in various cities outside the Guatemalan border. The largest troops allegedly attacked the Atlantic port city of Puerto Barrios, while others attacked the small towns of Esquipulas, Jutiapa, and Zacapa, Guatemala's largest border post. The invasion plan quickly faced difficulties; The 60-strong force was intercepted and jailed by Salvadoran police before it reached the border. At 8:20 am on June 18, 1954, Castillo Armas led his attacking troops on the border. Ten trained saboteurs preceded the invasion, with the aim of blowing up trains and cutting telegraph lines. At the same time, the Castillo Armas plane flew over the pro-government rally in the capital. Castillo Armas demands immediate handover of rbenz. The invasion sparked a brief panic in the capital, which rapidly declined when the rebels failed to make a striking move. Stunted by the supply and lack of transportation, Castillo Armas forces took several days to reach their targets, although their plane blew up the bridge on June 19.
When the rebels reach their target, they meet with further setbacks. The force of 122 people targeting Zacapa was intercepted and repulsed by a garrison of 30 Guatemalan soldiers, with only 30 rebels escaping death or arrest. The troops who attacked Puerto Barrios were sent by police and armed harbor workers, with many rebels fleeing to Honduras. In an effort to regain momentum, the rebel aircraft attempted air strikes to the capital. These attacks cause minor material damage, but they have a significant psychological impact, leading many to believe that invasion forces are stronger than they really are. The rebel bombers had to fly out of the capital of Managua, Nicaragua; as a result, they have a limited payload. A large number of them replaced dynamite or Molotov cocktails for bombs, in an attempt to create loud bangs with a lower load. The planes targeted ammunition depots, parade parades, and other visible targets.
Early in the morning of June 27, 1954, a CIA Lockheed P-38M Lightning attacked Puerto San JosÃÆ'Â © and dropped a napalm bomb on a British cargo ship, SS,, Springfjord, which was leased to a US company. Grace and Company Line, and is being saddled with Guatemalan cotton and coffee. This incident cost the CIA a million US dollars in compensation. On June 22, another rebel plane bombed the Honduran city of San Pedro de CopÃÆ'¡n; John Dulles claimed the attack was carried out by the Guatemalan air force, thus avoiding diplomatic consequences. A number of bombers who rebel forces began by being shot down by Guatemalan soldiers within days, causing Castillo Armas to demand more from the CIA. Eisenhower quickly agreed to provide this additional aircraft, strengthening the rebel forces. William Pawley has an important role to play in the delivery of this aircraft.
Psychological warfare
Castillo Armas's men with 480 men were not big enough to defeat the Guatemalan military, even with US-supplied aircraft. Therefore, the PBSUCCESS Operation Plan calls for a psychological war campaign, which will present Castillo Armas's victory as a fait accompli for the people of Guatemala, and will force the ÃÆ'rbenz to resign. The propaganda campaign had begun long before the invasion, with the US Information Agency (USIA) writing hundreds of articles on Guatemala based on the CIA report, and distributing tens of thousands of leaflets across Latin America. The CIA persuaded the friendly government to screen Guatemala video recordings that supported the US version of the show.
Alfhem ' in avoiding quarantine causes Washington to increase Guatemalan intimidation through its navy. On May 24, the US launched Operation HARDROCK BAKER, a Guatemalan sea blockade. The ships and submarines of Guatemala's coast patrol, and all approaching ships were stopped and searched; this includes ships from the UK and France, violating international law. But Britain and France did not protest strongly, in the hope that in return the US will not interfere with their efforts to subdue the rebel colonies in the Middle East. The intimidation was not merely a navy; on May 26 one of the Castillo Armas planes flew over the capital, dropping leaflets urging people to fight against communism and supporting Castillo Armas.
The most widely available psychological weapon is the Voice of Liberation radio station. It began broadcasting on May 1, 1954, carrying anti-communist propaganda, telling his listeners to reject the government of Ã-rbenz and support the liberating forces of Castillo Armas. The station claims to be broadcasting from deep forests in the interior of Guatemala, a message many listeners believe. In fact, those broadcasts were made in Miami by Guatemalans abroad, flown to Central America, and broadcast via mobile transmitters. Voice of Liberation makes the initial broadcast repeated four times, after which to send two-hour bulletins twice a day. The initial transmission only sounded intermittently in Guatemala City; A week later, the CIA significantly increased their transmission power, allowing clear acceptance in the Guatemalan capital. Radio broadcasts have been given much credit by historians for the success of the coup, due to the unrest they created across the country. They were abruptly aided by the blackouts of government-run radio stations, which stopped transmission for three weeks while new antennas were installed. This transmission continues throughout the conflict, broadcasting exaggerated news about rebel forces gathered in the capital, and contributing to the massive demoralization between the army and the civilian population.
Guatemalan response
The government of ÃÆ' rbenz was originally intended to repel the invasion by arming the population of the military, working militia, and the Guatemalan Army. Resistance from the armed forces, as well as public knowledge of the purchase of secret weapons, forced the President to supply weapons only to the Army. From the beginning of the invasion, ÃÆ' rbenz was convinced that Castillo Armas could be defeated militarily and declared his belief in public. But he fears the defeat for Castillo Armas will trigger a direct invasion by the US military. It also contributed to his decision not to arm civilians at first; has no military reason to do so, this may require the support of the army. Carlos Enrique DÃÆ'az, head of the Guatemalan armed forces, told ÃÆ' rbenz that arming civilians would be unpopular with his troops, and that "the army [will] do its work".
ÃÆ' rbenz instead told DÃÆ'az to select the officer to lead a counterattack. DÃÆ'az selects the officer corps which are all regarded as persons of personal integrity, and who are loyal to ÃÆ' rbenz. On the night of June 19, most Guatemalan troops in the capital region went to Zacapa, joining a smaller detachment of other garrisons. ÃÆ' rbenz stated that "the invasion is a joke", but worried if defeated at the Honduran border, Honduras would use it as an excuse to declare war on Guatemala, which would lead to the US invasion. Because of the rumors spread by the Voice of Liberation, there was concern throughout the village that the fifth column attack was imminent; a large number of farmers went to the government and asked for weapons to defend their country. They were repeatedly told that soldiers "managed to defend our country". Nevertheless, farmer volunteers assist government war effort, guard against roadblocks and donate supplies to the army. The delivery of weapons dropped by rebel aircraft was intercepted and handed over to the government.
The ÃÆ' rbenz government is also pursuing diplomatic means to try and end the invasion. It seeks support from El Salvador and Mexico; Mexico refused to be involved, and the Salvadoran government only reported Guatemala's efforts to Peurifoy. The biggest diplomatic initiative of ÃÆ' rbenz is bringing this issue to the United Nations Security Council. On June 18, the Guatemalan foreign minister petitioned the Council to "take the necessary action... to stop aggression," which Nicaragua and Honduras are said to be responsible for, along with "certain foreign monopolies that have been influenced by the progressive policies of my administration". The Security Council sees Guatemala's complaint at an emergency session on June 20. The debate is long and heated up, with Nicaragua and Honduras denying any wrongdoing, and the United States states that Eisenhower's role as a general in World War II shows that he is against imperialism. The Soviet Union is the only country that supports Guatemala. When the US and its allies proposed to refer the matter to the Organization of American States, the Soviet Union vetoed the proposal. Guatemala continues to press for Security Council investigations; the proposal received British and French support, but on June 24 it was vetoed by the US, first made against its allies. The US accompanies this with threats to foreign offices of both countries that the US will stop supporting other initiatives. UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöd called the US position "the most serious blow so far aimed at [the United Nations]". The fact-finding mission was established by the Inter-American Peace Committee; Washington used its influence to delay the entry of the committee until a coup was over and a military dictator was installed.
resignation ÃÆ' rbenz
ÃÆ' rbenz was initially convinced that his troops would soon send rebel forces. A small garrison victory of 30 soldiers over 180 powerful rebel forces outside Zacapa reinforced his belief. On June 21, Guatemalan soldiers gathered in Zacapa under the command of Colonel VÃÆ'ctor M. LeÃÆ'³n, who is believed to be loyal to ÃÆ' rbenz. LeÃÆ'³n told ÃÆ' rbenz that the counter-attack would be delayed for logistical reasons, but convinced him not to worry, as Castillo Armas would be defeated soon. Other members of the government are not so sure. Army Chief of Staff Parinello inspected troops in Zacapa on June 23, and returned to the capital in the belief that soldiers would not fight. Fearing US intervention in favor of Castillo Armas, he did not say his suspicion ÃÆ' rbenz. PGT leaders also began to have their suspicions; acting secretary-general Alvarado MonzÃÆ'³n sent a member of the central committee to Zacapa to investigate. He returned on 25 June, reported that the army was highly demoralized, and would not fight. MonzÃÆ'³n reported this to ÃÆ' rbenz, who quickly sent another investigator. He also returned the same report, carrying an additional message to ÃÆ' rbenz from officers in Zacapa - asking the President to resign. The officers believe that with US support for the rebels, defeat is inevitable, and ÃÆ' rbenz should be blamed for it. He stated that if ÃÆ' rbenz did not resign, the army would likely deal with Castillo Armas, and march in the capital with him.
During this period, Castillo Armas began to intensify air strikes, with an extra aircraft approved by Eisenhower. They have limited material success; many of their bombs were surplus material from World War II, and failed to explode. Nevertheless, they have a significant psychological impact. On June 25, the same day when he received a military ultimatum, ÃÆ' rbenz learned that Castillo Armas had printed what later proved his sole military victory, defeating the Guatemalan garrison in Chiquimula. Historian Piero Gleijeses has stated that if it were not for US support for the uprising, the Guatemalan army officer corps would remain loyal to ÃÆ' rbenz because, although they were not uniformly supportive, they were more alert to Castillo Armas, and also had strong nationalist views. Therefore, they believe that the US will intervene militarily, leading to a battle that they can not win.
On the night of 25 June, ÃÆ' rbenz held a meeting of senior government leaders, political parties, and trade unions. Colonel Daz is also present. The President informed them that soldiers in Zacapa had left the government, and that civilians should be armed to defend the country. Daz did not object, and the unions promised several thousand troops between them. When the troops were deployed the next day, only a few hundred appeared. The capital's civilian population had fought alongside the Guatemalan Revolution twice before - during the popular uprising of 1944, and again during the 1949 coup attempt - but on this occasion the army, intimidated by the United States, refused to fight. Trade union members are reluctant to fight their own invasions and military. Seeing this, DÃÆ'az denied his support of the President, and began planning to overthrow ÃÆ' rbenz with the help of other senior officers. They told Peurifoy about this plan, asking him to stop hostilities in return for ÃÆ' rbenz's resignation. Peurifoy promised to arrange a truce, and the gang went to ÃÆ' rbenz and informed him of their decision. ÃÆ' rbenz, was completely exhausted and sought to maintain at least one measure of democratic reform it carried, agreed without objection. After notifying his cabinet of his decision, he left the presidential palace at 8 pm on June 27, 1954, after recording a resignation speech broadcast an hour later. In it, he declared that he resigned to remove the "excuse for invasion", and that he wanted to retain the October 1944 Revolutionary advantage. He walked to the nearest Mexican Embassy, ​​seeking political asylum. Two months later he was given a safe trip abroad, and flew into exile in Mexico. Some 120 ÃÆ' rbenz loyalists or communists were also allowed to leave, and no planned murder plans by the CIA were actually implemented.
Military administration
As soon as the President announces his resignation, DÃÆ'az announces on the radio that he takes over the presidency, and that the army will continue to fight against the invasion of Castillo Armas. He led the military junta which also consisted of Colonel Elfego HernÃÆ'¡n MonzÃÆ'³n Aguirre and Jose Angel SÃÆ'¡nchez. Two days later, Ambassador Peurifoy told DÃÆ'az that he should resign because, in the words of a CIA officer speaking to DÃÆ'az, he was "unsuited to American foreign policy". Peurifoy condemned DÃÆ'az for allowing ÃÆ' rbenz to criticize the United States in his resignation speech; Meanwhile, a US-trained pilot dropped a bomb in a major army powder magazine, to intimidate the colonel. Soon afterwards, DÃÆ'az was overthrown by a bloodless coup led by Colonel MonzÃÆ'³n, who was more lenient to US interests. DÃÆ'az later stated that Peurifoy had given him a list of communist names, and demanded that everything be shot the next day; DÃÆ'az refused, turning Peurifoy farther on him. On June 17, the army leaders in Zacapa started negotiating with Castillo Armas. They signed an agreement, Pacto de Las Tunas , three days later, which placed soldiers in Zacapa under the leadership of Castillo Armas, in return for a general amnesty. Soldiers returned to their barracks a few days later, "desperate, with a terrible defeat".
Although MonzÃÆ'³n is staunchly anti-communist and repeatedly speaks of his loyalty to the US, he does not want to hand over power to Castillo Armas. The fall of DÃÆ'az has made Peurifoy believe that the CIA should make its way and let the State Department play a major role in negotiating with the new Guatemalan government. The State Department asked ÃÆ' â € Å"parut Osorio, the dictator of El Salvador, to invite all players to negotiate in San Salvador. Osorio agrees, and MonzÃÆ'³n and Castillo Armas arrive in the capital Salvador on 30 June. Peurifoy initially remained in Guatemala City, avoiding the appearance of a heavy US role, but he was forced to travel to San Salvador when the negotiations were almost over on the first day. In the words of John Dulles, Peurifoy's role is "solving multiple heads together". Neither MonzÃÆ'³n nor Castillo Armas were able to remain in power without US support, and thus Peurifoy was able to force a deal, announced at 4:45 am on July 2. Under the agreement, Castillo Armas and his subordinates Major Enrique Trinidad Oliva joined the junta of three people led by MonzÃÆ'³n, who remains president. On July 7, Colonel Dubois and Cruz Salazar, supporters of MonzÃÆ'³n in the junta, resigned, according to the secret agreement they made without the knowledge of MonzÃÆ'³n. The numbers were defeated, MonzÃÆ'³n also resigned, allowing Castillo Armas to be elected unanimously as junta president. Both colonels were paid 100,000 US dollars each for their cooperation. The US immediately recognizes the new government on July 13. Soon after serving as President, Castillo Armas confronted a coup d'état of young army cadets, who were unhappy with surrendering the army to him. The coup was destroyed, leaving 29 people dead and 91 wounded. The elections were held in early October, from which all political parties were banned. Castillo Armas is the only candidate; he won the election with 99% of the vote, completing the transition into power.
Reactions
Guatemala kup d'ÃÆ' Â © tat is vilified internationally. Le Monde of Paris and The Times from London attacked the United States coup as a "modern form of economic colonialism". In Latin America, public and official opinion is critical of the United States, and for many Guatemala is a symbol of armed resistance to US hegemony. Former British Prime Minister Clement Attlee called it "a simple act of aggression". When Allen Dulles described the coup as a "democratic" victory over communism and claimed that the situation in Guatemala was "healed by Guatemala itself", a British official said that "in places, perhaps almost Molotov speaks of... Czechoslovakia or Hitler speaks of Austria ". UN Secretary General HammarskjÃÆ'¶ld said that a paramilitary invasion overthrown by Guatemala's elected government was a geopolitical act that violated the UN Charter's human rights provisions. Even that is usually pro-US. West German newspapers condemned the coup. Kate Doyle, Director of the Mexican National Security Project, described the coup as a severe blow to democracy in Guatemala.
The coup has widespread support among US politicians. Historian Piero Gleijeses writes that the foreign policy of both Republican and Democratic parties expressed strong claims to US hegemony over Central America, making them inclined to see communist threats where none exist. Thus Eisenhower's continuation of the Monroe Doctrine continues to support bipartisanism. The coup met with a strong negative reaction in Latin America; a wave of anti-US protests following the overthrow of ÃÆ' rbenz. These sentiments persist for decades afterwards; historians have referred to the coup as a reason for the unfriendly acceptance given to US Vice President Richard Nixon when he visited Latin America four years later. A State Department study found that negative public reactions to the coup had occurred in eleven Latin American countries, including some that were otherwise pro-American. Historian John Lewis Gaddis stated that the knowledge of the CIA's role in the coup in Iran and Guatemala gave the agency "an almost mystical reputation throughout Latin America and the Middle East as an instrument that could make the United States overthrow an unwelcome government whenever they want to".
Aftermath
Operation PBHISTORY
The PBHISTORY operation was an attempt by the CIA to analyze documents from the government of ÃÆ' rbenz to justify a 1954 coup after the fact, in particular by finding evidence that the Guatemalan communist was under the influence of the Soviet Union. Due to the rapid overthrow of the government of ÃÆ' rbenz, the CIA believes that the government will not be able to destroy the burdensome documents, and that these can be analyzed to show the ig rbenz supposedly Soviet relations. The CIA also believes this will help better understand the workings of Latin American communist parties, in which the CIA subjects have little real information. The last motivation was that the international response to the coup was very negative, even among US allies, and the CIA wanted to oppose this anti-US. sentiment. The operation began on 4 July 1954 with the arrival of four CIA agents in Guatemala City, led by a specialist in the structure of communist parties. Their targets include personal belongings of rbenz, police documents, and the headquarters of the Guatemalan Workers' Party.
Although initial searches failed to find any connection with the Soviet Union, the CIA decided to expand operations, and on August 4 a much larger team was deployed, with members from many government departments, including the State Department and AGE. The task force is named after the Social Research Group. To avoid confrontation with Guatemalan nationalists, the CIA chose to leave Guatemala's documents instead of funding the creation of a Guatemalan intelligence agency that would try to disassemble communist organizations. Thus the National Defense Committee Against Communism (ComitÃÆ'Â © de Defensa Nacional Contra el Comunismo) was formed on July 20, and provides much power over the functions of the military and police. The personnel of the new agency are also working on analyzing the same document. Phase of processing of operating documents was discontinued on 28 September 1954, after examining 500,000 documents. There is tension between various US government agencies about the use of such information; The CIA wants to use it to subvert communists, AGE for propaganda. The CIA's operations leadership allows it to retain control over any documents deemed necessary for covert operations. The consequence of PBHISTORY is the opening of a CIA file to the Argentine communist Ernesto Che Guevara.
In the following decade, the documents collected were used by authors of several books, most often with the help of CIA secrets, depicting the Guatemalan Revolution and the 1954 coup in favor of the CIA. Despite the CIA's efforts, international and academic reaction to US policy remained very negative. Even the books funded in part by the CIA are somewhat critical of his role. PBHISTORY failed in its primary purpose to find convincing evidence that the PGT was a tool of the Soviet Union, or even that it had connections to Moscow at all. The Soviet description of the coup, that the US had destroyed the democratic revolution to protect United Fruit Company's control over the Guatemalan economy, became far more widely accepted. Historian Mark Hove states that "PBHistory operations have proved ineffective because of the 'burning new hatred' that emerged in Latin America over US intervention in Guatemala."
Political heritage
The 1954 coup had a huge political impact both inside and outside Guatemala. The relatively easy overthrow of ÃÆ' rbenz, which occurred immediately after a similar overthrow of the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran in 1953, left the CIA too confident in its abilities, causing the Bay of Pigs Invasion to fail to overthrow the Cuban government in 1961. lived in Guatemala City during the coup was Ernesto Che Guevara, 25 years old. After several unsuccessful attempts to fight on the side of the government, Guevara took refuge in the Argentine embassy, ​​before finally being given a safe passage to Mexico, where he would join the Cuban Revolution. His experience of the Guatemalan coup is a major factor in convincing him "of the need for armed struggle... against imperialism", and will inform his successful military strategy during the Cuban Revolution. The ÃÆ' rbenz experience during the Guatemalan coup also helped Cuban regime Fidel Castro in foiling the CIA invasion. Over the years of the Guatemalan Revolution, both US policymakers and the US media have tended to believe in the theory of communist threats. When ÃÆ' rbenz announced that he had evidence of US involvement in the SalamÃÆ'¡ incident, it had been dismissed, and almost the entire US press described Castillo Armas's invasion as a dramatic victory against communism. The press in Latin America was less controlled in their criticism of the United States, and the coup resulted in long-lasting anti-American sentiments in the region.
In Guatemala, Castillo Armas is worried that he does not have popular support, and thus seeks to eliminate all opposition. He immediately arrested several thousand opposition leaders, branded them communists, withdrew the 1945 constitution, and granted him an almost uncontrollable power. Concentration camps were built to hold prisoners when prisons overflowed. Acting on the advice of Allen Dulles, Castillo Armas detained a number of citizens who tried to flee the country. He also established the National Defense Committee against Communism, with the power of arrest, detention, and deportation. Over the next few years, the committee investigated nearly 70,000 people. Many are jailed, executed, or "disappeared," often without trial. He banned all trade unions, peasant organizations, and political parties, except for himself, the National Liberation Movement (Moviiento de LiberaciÃÆ'³n Nacional , MLN), which ruled until 1957, and remained in several decades later. Castillo Armas's dependence on the mercenary and mercenary corps that had made him powerful led to widespread corruption, and the Eisenhower administration immediately subsidized the Guatemalan government with millions of dollars. Castillo Armas also reversed the agrarian reform ÃÆ' rbenz, leading the US embassy to comment that it was a "long retreat" from previous policy. UFC did not take advantage of the coup; despite regaining most of its privileges, its profits continue to decline, and eventually join other companies to save themselves from bankruptcy. Despite the influence some local Catholic Church leaders have in a coup, the anti-Catholic restrictions imposed under previous administrations in Guatemala will begin in the 1960s, as many anti-communist governments feel the Church has too much sympathy for the socialists. party.
Civil War
The gradual progressive policies of the civilian government resulted in a series of leftist rebellions in the countryside, beginning in 1960. This triggered the 36-year Guatemalan Civil War between the US-backed Guatemalan government and left-wing rebels, who often received popular support in large numbers. The largest of these movements is led by the Poor Army Guerrillas, which at its largest point has 270,000 members. During the civil war, atrocities against civilians were committed by both parties; 93% of these violations were committed by US-backed military, which included a charred genocide campaign against the indigenous population of the Maya in the 1980s. The violence was very severe during the presidency of RÃÆ'os Montt and Lucas GarcÃÆ'a.
Many other human rights violations were committed, including massacres of civilians, rape, aerial bombing and enforced disappearances. Gleijeses writes that Guatemala is "overwhelmed by a culture of fear", and that it holds "a terrible record for violations of human rights in Latin America". These violations are in part the result of a brutal anti-insurgency strategy adopted by the government. The ideological narrative that the 1954 coup had represented the fight against communism was often used to justify violence in the 1980s. Historians relate the violence of civil war to the 1954 coup, and the "anti-communist paranoia" it produces. The civil war ended in 1996, with a peace deal between the guerrillas and the Guatemalan government, which included amnesty for fighters on both sides. The civil war claimed the lives of some 200,000 civilians.
Apology
In March 1999, US President Bill Clinton apologized to the Guatemalan government for the atrocities committed by US-backed dictatorships. Clinton stated "For the United States, it is important for me to state clearly that support for military forces and intelligence units involved in widespread violence and oppression is wrong, and the United States should not repeat the mistake." Apologies came soon after the release of a truth commission report documenting US support for the genocide forces.
In May 2011 the Guatemalan government signed an agreement with the surviving family of ÃÆ' rbenz to restore its legacy and apologize to the public for the government's role in ousting it. This includes financial settlement for the family. An official apology was made at the National Palace by Guatemalan President ÃÆ' lvaro Colom on October 20, 2011, for J
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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