The role of The United States in the Vietnam War began after World War II and increased to full commitment during the Vietnam War from 1955 to 1975. US involvement in South Vietnam came from 20 years of political and economic action. It has a general push to end the growing communist dominance in Vietnam. At that time, French troops, US allies, backed by America - President Harry S. Truman gave an increasing amount of increased financial and military aid to French troops fighting in Vietnam. From the spring of 1950, their involvement increased from only helping French troops to provide direct military assistance to the countries concerned (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia). Finally, the US mission is carried out at a more constant level by sending an increase in the number of military aid from the United States. Their main goal is to limit the Communist dominance present in the Vietnamese government as it will soon lead to a chain of neighboring countries adopting the same thing. This will result in a change of power balance throughout Southeast Asia. The formation of US foreign policy sees the interests of national security disrupted by the rise of this communist expansion and seeks to take any steps to end it. Their actions came into question by other segments of government and society, however, including the US congress.
Estimates of the number of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians killed varied from 966,000 to 3,812,000. The conflict also resulted in 58,318 US troops killed.
Feb 1965 - Operation Rolling Thunder begins
- July 1965 - Send troops to Vietnam for the first time
- 1966 - Lyndon B. Johnson expands the number of troops sent to Vietnam
Richard M. Nixon (1969 -74)
- 1969 - Richard Nixon continues the war, but by reducing the number of US troops through the Vietnamization strategy.
Video Role of the United States in the Vietnam War
Di bawah Pemerintahan Kennedy
In 1961 the new administration of President John F. Kennedy remained essentially committed to bi-partisan, anti-communist foreign policies inherited from the administrations of President Truman and Eisenhower. During 1961, his first year in office, Kennedy found himself confronted with a three-part crisis: The failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba; the building of the Berlin Wall by the Soviets; and a negotiated settlement between the pro-Western Laotian government and the communist movement of Pathet Lao. Fearing that another US failure to halt communist expansion would severely damage US credibility with its allies, Kennedy realized, "Now we have a problem in making our powers credible... and Vietnam looks like the place. The commitment to defend South Vietnam was reaffirmed by Kennedy on May 11 in the 52nd National Security Action Memorandum, which came to be known as the "Presidential Program for Vietnam". His opening statement reads:
The purpose and concept of US operations is to prevent South Vietnamese communist dominance; to create in that country a viable and democratic society, and to initiate, accelerating, a series of mutually supportive actions of military, political, economic, psychological, and secret characters designed to achieve this goal.
Kennedy is interested in the idea of ​​using US Army Special Forces for counter-insurgency conflicts in Third World countries threatened by a new "national liberation war". Originally intended to be used behind the frontline after the conventional invasion of Europe, Kennedy believed that guerrilla tactics used by Special Forces would be effective in the "fire brush" war in South Vietnam. He sees England's success in using such powers during the Malayan Emergency as a strategic template. So in May 1961 Kennedy sent the Green Beret detachment to South Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese army in guerrilla warfare.
The Di regime had initially been able to overcome the rebellion of the National Front for the Liberation of Southern Vietnam (NLF, or undermining, Viet Cong) in South Vietnam with the help of US pamphlets and advisors, and, by 1962, seemed to be on the upper hand. Senior US military leaders received positive reports from US commander, Gen. Paul D. Harkins of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, or MACV. However, the following year, cracks began to appear in the façade of success. In January a possible victory turned into a shocking defeat for government troops at the Battle of Ap Bac causing concern among both military advisers on the ground and among politicians in Washington, DC JFK also pointed out to Walter Cronkite that war might not be won. , and that in the end is a Vietnam war, not an American war.
In? M has grown unpopular with many of his compatriots because of his government's nepotism, corruption, and a clear bias in favor of the Catholic minority - Di? M is part - at the expense of the majority of Buddhas. This contributed to the impression of Di'm's rule as an extension of the French Colonial regime. The promised land reforms are not institutionalized, and the strategic Strategic Village program for village defense (and government control) is a disaster. The Kennedy administration is increasingly frustrated with Di? M. In 1963 a crackdown by troops Di? M was launched against Buddhist monks protesting against discriminatory practices and demanding political voices. The above persecution of the protests triggered the so-called Buddhist Revolution, in which some monks engage in self-immolation, covered by the world press. The Communists took full advantage of the situation and sparked anti-Di sentiment to create further instability.
Maps Role of the United States in the Vietnam War
Americanization
Tonkin Bay and Westmoreland expansion
On July 27, 1964, 5,000 other US military advisers were ordered to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN or South Vietnam), bringing the total number of American troops to 21,000. Soon an incident took place off the coast of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam) destined to raise the conflict to a new level and led to full-scale warfare Americanization.
On the night of August 2, 1964, the destroyer of the USS Maddox was conducting an electronic intelligence gathering mission in international waters (even as claimed by North Vietnam) in the Gulf of Tonkin when attacked by three P-4 torpedoes from the Vietnamese Navy North. The report then reaches the Johnson administration saying that Maddox is under attack. Two nights later, after joining the destroyer of C. Turner Joy, the Maddox reported that both ships were attacked (this event, which occurred under adverse weather conditions, never actually happen). Regardless, President Johnson spoke to Congress asking for more political power to harness American military power in South Vietnam, using an attack on Maddox as an excuse to get what he wants.
There was widespread confusion in Washington, but the incident was seen by the government as a perfect opportunity to present Congress with a "pre-determined war declaration" to reinforce the weakening morale in South Vietnam through retaliatory attacks by the US in the North.. Even before confirmation of the ghost attack had been received in Washington, President Johnson had decided that an attack could not be answered.
Just before midnight he appeared on television and announced that a retaliatory air raid was underway against North Vietnam's naval and port facilities. Both Congress and the American people learned the whole story of events in the Gulf of Tonkin until the publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1969. It was on the basis of a government statement that the attack was "unfounded aggression" on the part of North Vietnam, that the American Congress United adopted Southeast Asia Resolution (also known as Tonkin Resolution of Teluk Tonkin) on 7 August. The law gives the President widespread power to conduct military operations without actual war declarations. The resolution passed unanimously in the House and was opposed in the Senate by only two members.
Members of the National Security Council, including US Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and General Maxwell Taylor, agreed on Nov. 28 to recommend Johnson adopt a plan to escalate the two stages of the North Vietnamese bombing.
Operation Rolling Thunder, 1965-68
In February 1965, a US air base in Pleiku, in the Central Plateau of Southern Vietnam, was twice attacked by the NLF, which resulted in the deaths of over a dozen US personnel. This guerrilla attack prompted the government to order a counter-attack on North Vietnam.
The Rolling Thunder operation is the code name given for a sustainable strategic bombing campaign directed against North Korea by US Air Force and Navy aircraft that was inaugurated on March 2, 1965. Its original purpose was to raise morale from South Vietnam and serves as a signal to Hanoi. US air power will act as a "strategic persuasion" method, blocking North Vietnam politically by fear of continuing or rising bombardment. Rolling Thunder is gradually increasing in intensity, with the aircraft only attacking carefully selected targets. When that did not work, the goal was changed to crush the will of North Vietnam to fight by destroying the national industrial base, transport network, and air defense (which continues to rise). After more than a million sorties were flown and three quarters of a million ton bombs were dropped, the Rolling Thunder ended on November 11, 1968.
Other air campaigns (Operation Barrel Roll, Tiger Hank Operations, Tiger Hound Operations, and Commando Hunt Operations) are directed against the human and material streams under the PAVN logistics system that flows from North Vietnam through southeastern Laos, and to South Vietnam known as Ho Chi Minh Trail.
Build-up
President Johnson has appointed General William C. Westmoreland to replace General Harkins as MACV Commander in June 1964. Under Westmoreland, the expansion of American forces in South Vietnam took place. American forces increased from 16,000 during 1964 to over 553,000 in 1969. With the US decision to increase its involvement, the Pact of ANZUS The Australian and New Zealand Pact agreed to donate troops and death to the conflict. They quickly joined the Republic of Korea (second only to America in troop strength), Thailand, and the Philippines. The US pays (through aid dollars) and logistically supplies all the allied forces.
Meanwhile, political affairs in Saigon finally settled - at least as far as America is concerned. On February 14, the latest military junta, the National Leadership Committee, deployed Nguy Air Vice Marshal? N Cao K? as prime minister. In 1966, the junta chose General Nguy'n V'n Thi? U to run for president with Ky on voting as vice presidential candidate in the 1967 election. Thieu and Ky were elected and remained in office during the war. In the 1971 presidential election, Thieu ran for president without resistance. With the installation of Thieu and Ky (Second Republic) governments, the United States has a flexible, stable, and semi-legal government in Saigon to handle.
With the advent of Rolling Thunder , airbases and American facilities must be built and manned for air effort. The defense of those bases will not be entrusted to South Vietnam. So, on March 8, 1965, 3,500 US Marines landed in Da Nang as the first wave of US combat troops to South Vietnam, adding 25,000 existing US military advisers. The deployment of US Government ground forces to Da Nang was not consulted with the Vietnamese government. Instead of initial deployment and gradual buildup is a unilateral decision by the US government. On May 5, the 173th US Air Brigade became the first US Army ground unit committed to the conflict in South Vietnam. On August 18, Operation Starlite began as the first US ground operation, destroying the NLF fort at Qu'ng NgÃÆ'ÂÂ i Province. The NLF learns from their defeat and then tries to avoid fighting American ground warfare by returning to small guerrilla operations.
North Vietnam had sent their regular army units to southern Vietnam from late 1964. Officials in Hanoi had liked the direct invasion of the South, and plans were developed to use the PAVN unit to break southern Vietnam halfway through Central Mountain. The two imported enemies were first encountered with each other during Operation Silver Bayonet, better known as the Battle of Drang. During the barbaric battles that ensued, both sides learned important lessons. North Vietnam, which has grisly casualties, is beginning to adapt to America's extraordinary superiority in air mobility, supporting weapons, and closing air support by moving as closely as possible during confrontation, thus negating the above effects. Americans learned that the PAVN (which is basically a mild infantry force) is not a guerrilla band, but rather a highly disciplined, adept, and motivated force.
Search and destroy, an array strategy
On November 27, 1965, the Pentagon stated that if the major operations needed to neutralize North Vietnamese troops and NLFs would be successful, the level of US forces in South Vietnam should be increased from 120,000 to 400,000. In a series of meetings between Westmoreland and the President held in Honolulu in February 1966, Westmoreland argued that the US presence had managed to prevent an imminent defeat of the South Vietnamese government but that more troops would be needed if systematic offensive operations had to be carried out.. The problem then becomes what kind of American power will be used.
The nature of American military strategic and tactical decisions made during this period will color the behavior and nature of the conflict during American commitments. Classical military logic demands that the US attack the PAVN/NLF locus in the North. If the country can not be attacked, then the enemy logistic system in Laos and Cambodia must be cut by ground troops, isolating the southern battlefield. However, political considerations restrict US military action, largely because of the memory of communist reaction during the Korean War. What has always been in the minds of diplomats, army officers and politicians is the possibility of escalating escalating conflict into a superpower confrontation and a possible nuclear exchange. Therefore, there will be no North Vietnamese invasion, the "neutrality" of Laos and Cambodia will be respected, and Rolling Thunder will not resemble the bombing of Germany and Japan during the Second World War.
This limitation is not inserted into the military as an afterthought. Before the first US troops landed in Da Nang, the Pentagon became aware of all the parameters to be imposed by their civilian leaders, but they still agreed that the mission could be solved within them. Westmoreland believes he has found a strategy that will defeat North Vietnam or force him into serious negotiations. Friction is the key. The general claimed that a larger offensive operation would crush the communists and eventually lead to a "crossover point" in the PAVN/NLF victim after which a decisive victory (or at least politics) would be possible.
It is widely maintained that the average US soldier is nineteen years old, as evidenced by casual references in pop songs ("19" by Paul Hardcastle); the picture was quoted by Lt. Col. Dave Grossman ret. The Killology Research Group in his 1995 book About Killing: The Psychological Cost of Killing Learning in War and Society (p.Ã, 265). However, it was disputed by the Vietnam Aviation Helicopter Flight Network Site, which claims the average age of MOS 11B personnel is 22. This compares to 26 years for those who participated in World War II. Soldiers serve one year of tour duty. The average age of US military men who died in Vietnam was 22.8 years.
The one-year tour of the task of seizing an experienced leadership unit. As one observer observed, "we are not in Vietnam for 10 years, but for one year 10 times." As a result, training programs are shortened. Some NCOs are referred to as "Shake 'N' Bake" to highlight accelerated training. Unlike soldiers in World War II and Korea, there is no safe back ground for rest and relaxation. An unknown soldier told United Press International that there is nothing to do in Vietnam and therefore many of the men who smoke cannabis. He said, "One of the biggest reasons why a lot of GIs get high up here is nothing can be done.This place is really dragging, it's boring here.As now sitting around here, we start loading" Though, it's not really makes you fucked up; that's why I think the main reason why we suck it. "
American forces will conduct operations against the PAVN troops, pushing them further back into the countryside away from the densely packed coastal lowlands. In the interior of the United States can fully utilize its superiority in firepower and mobility to wipe out enemies in set-pieces battles. Cleaning up the NLF and securing the villages will be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese military. The adoption of this strategy, however, brought Westmoreland into direct conflict with its Marine Corps commander, General Lewis W. Walt, who has recognized the security of the villages as the key to success. Walt immediately began a peaceful effort in his area of ​​responsibility, but Westmoreland displeased, believing that the Marines were under-utilized and fought the wrong enemy. In the end, MACV won and the concept of Westmoreland's search and destruction, based on the friction of the enemy forces, won the day.
Both parties chose the same strategy. PAVN, which has been running a bigger conventional war unit, switched back to small unit operations in the face of US military capabilities. The struggle moved to the villages, where the "hearts and minds" of the peasants of South Vietnam, whose cooperation is absolutely necessary for military success, will be won or lost. The US has given responsibility for this struggle to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), whose troops and commanders are notoriously unfit for the task.
For the American army, whose doctrine is one of the absolute commitments to total victory, this strategy leads to a frustrating little unit war. Most of the fighting was done by units smaller than battalion size (the majority at platoon level). Since the purpose of the operation was to kill the enemy, the field was not taken and held as in the previous war. The wild fighting and the retreat of communism soon followed by the neglect of the newly seized terrain. Combined with this is the anger and frustration that arises among American troops by the effective tactics of the NLF, which are waging sniping, mine, landmines and terror against America.
As a result of a conference held in Honolulu, President Johnson authorized an increase in troop strength to 429,000 in August 1966. The large increase of troops enabled MACV to perform many operations that grew in size and complexity over the next two years. For US troops participating in this operation (Operation Masher/White Wing), Attleboro Operation ,
During the Vietnam War, the use of helicopters, known as "Air Mobile", was an important tool for wars. In fact, the whole behavior and strategy of war depends on it. Vietnam is the first time a helicopter has been used on a large scale, and in such an important role. Find and destroy missions, for example, is almost impossible without it. The helicopter allowed the American commander to move large numbers of troops everywhere, regardless of terrain or roads. Troops can also be easily re-supplied in remote areas. The helicopter also provides another new and vital capability: medical evacuation. It can fly an injured soldier to help the station very quickly, usually within the critical first hour. It gave the army a wounded higher chance to survive in Vietnam than in previous wars. The helicopter has also been adapted for many other roles in Vietnam, including ground attacks, surveillance, and electronic warfare. Without helicopters, war will happen very differently.
Battle border and Tet Attack
In mid-1967, Westmoreland said it was conceivable that US troops could be removed from the war within two years, progressively reversing more battles into the ARVN. That fall, however, fierce fighting broke out in the northern province. Beginning under the DMZ at Con Tien and then spreading westward to the border of Laos near Dak To, the great PAVN troops begin to defend and fight. The communist willingness to stay in place inspired MACV to send reinforcements from other sectors in South Vietnam. The Border Fighting has begun.
Most PAVN/NLF operational capabilities are only possible due to unobstructed movement of men along the Ho Chi Minh Trail. To threaten this supply flow, the Marine Corps formed a combat base on the South side of Vietnam on the border of Laos, near the village of Khe Sanh. The United States used the base as a border surveillance position facing Route 9, the only east-west road across the border in the province. Westmoreland also hopes to use the base as a jumping point for any future attacks on the Trail system in Laos. During the spring of 1967, a series of small unit actions near Khe Sanh prompted MACV to increase its power. The action of this small unit and the increase of intelligence information indicates that PAVN builds significant strength across the border.
Indeed, PAVN does that. Two regular divisions (and then the third element) move towards Khe Sanh, eventually circling the base and cutting off the only access road. Westmoreland, contrary to the advice of its Marine commander, reinforced the outpost. As far as he knows, if the communists are willing to move their troops to be destroyed by American air power, it is much better. He described the ideal result as "Dien Bien Phu in reverse". MACV then launched the largest concentrated air bombing effort of the conflict (Operation Niagara) to defend Khe Sanh. Another major air effort was made to keep the beleaguered Marines supplied. There are many comparisons (by the media, the American military and political officials, and North Vietnam) to the possibility of PAVN repeating its victory at Dien Bien Phu, but the difference is more than any equation in any comparison.
MACV uses this opportunity to bring the latest technology against North Vietnam. The sensor-controlled anti-infiltration system known as Operation Igloo White is in the process of field testing in Laos because the Khe Sanh siege begins. Westmoreland ordered that it be used to detect the movement of PAVN troops near the Marine base and the system works well. In March, the long-awaited ground attack on the base failed to materialize and communist forces began to melt back into Laos. MACV (and future historians) have only questions. What is the purpose of PAVN? Is the siege a real effort to roll out another Dien Bien Phu? Or is the battle near the border (which eventually pulls half of the MACV maneuver battalion) into a diversion, intended to pull troops away from the cities, where another PAVN attack will begin soon?
General public certainty of Westmoreland that "light at the end of the tunnel" was imminent when, on 30 January 1968, PAVN and NLF troops violated the ceasefire that accompanied T? T and stepped up their biggest attack so far, in hopes of sparking a general uprising among the South Vietnamese. These forces, ranging from small groups to entire regiments, attacked almost every city and major military installations in South Vietnam. America and South Vietnam, initially shocked by its scope and offensive scale, quickly responded and inflicted heavy casualties on their enemies. NLF is essentially eliminated as combat power and dead places in its ranks are increasingly filled by North Vietnamese.
The fast and bloody attacks of PAVN/NLF were repulsed in almost all areas except Saigon, where the fighting lasted for three days, and in the old imperial capital Hu ?, where it continued for a month. During the occupation of the historic city, 2,800 South Vietnamese were killed by the NLF in one of the largest massacres in the conflict. The expected rebellion never happened; indeed, the attack prompted some South Vietnamese people who were previously apathetic to fight for the government. Another surprise for the communists is that the ARVN did not collapse under the onslaught, instead turning in an appearance that even delighted American supporters.
After the Offensive Tet, influential news and newspaper magazines, including the Wall Street Journal Time and The New York Times , are increasingly beginning to characterize war as a way dead end. What surprises and worries the American public is the realization that it has been deceived or that American military command is very optimistic in its assessment of the situation in Vietnam. The public can not understand how such an attack is possible after being told for several years that the victory is imminent. The Tet attack came to realize the growing credibility gap at the heart of the US government statement. This realization and change of attitude forces the American public (and politicians) to face up to harsh realities and to reexamine their position in Southeast Asia. Moreover, US media coverage makes it increasingly clear that the overall victory in Vietnam will not happen. This also greatly undermined domestic support for Johnson's administration at the time. The days of open commitment to the conflict have ended.
The offensive psychological impact of Tet effectively ends Lyndon Johnson's political career. On March 11, Senator Eugene McCarthy won 42 percent of the vote in primary Democrat New Hampshire. Although Johnson is not on the ballot, commentators see this as a defeat for the President. Soon afterwards, Senator Robert Kennedy announced his intention to seek a Democratic nomination for the 1968 presidential election. On March 31, in a speech that made America and the world shocked, Johnson announced that "I will not seek, and I will not accept my party nomination for another term as your President "and promised to devote the rest of his tenure in office to seek peace in Vietnam. Johnson announced that he limited the bombing of North Vietnam to the north of the Demilitarized Zone and that US representatives were ready to meet with Northern Vietnamese partners in a suitable place "to discuss ways to end this bad war". A few days later, many surprises for Johnson, North Vietnam to approve contact between the two sides. On May 13, what came to be known as the Paris peace talks began.
My Lai Massacre
On March 16, 1968, three companies from Task Force Barker, part of the Americal Division, took part in search and destruction operations near the village of My Lai, in the province of Qu? Ng Nam. Although not all members of the company participated, a large number of them, led by Calley, did so. He personally ordered the execution of hundreds of villagers in large groups. The killing came to an end only when an American helicopter crew, led by Hugh Thompson's Court Guard, Jr., found the Calley unit in action and threatened to attack them with their aircraft weapons unless they stopped. One of the soldiers at the scene was Ron Haeberle, a photographer for the Star and Line newspapers, who took photographs of unfashionable black and white through his camera-mounted lens and the color shot of the camera massacre personally. Although the operation looked suspicious of Calley's bosses, it was forgotten.
In 1969, investigative journalist Seymour Hersh exposed the My Lai massacre in print, and Haeberle's photo was released to the world media. The Pentagon launched an investigation led by General William R. Peers to investigate the allegations. After the activity, the Peers Commission released its report. It states that "the atmosphere of atrocity" surrounds the event, concluding that the massacre has occurred and the crime has been covered up by the commander of the Americal Division and its executive officers. Perhaps 400 Vietnamese civilians, mostly elderly men, women, and children have been killed by Charlie's company. Some people were charged in murder, but only Calley was punished. He was sentenced to life in prison by a military court in 1970, but after many appeals he was finally released; he has served more than three years of house arrest.
Although My Lai generates many civilian allegations and bad publicity for the military, it is not the only massacre. The File of the Vietnam War Crimes Working Group published in 1994 by the "Freedom of Information Act" reveals seven, though much smaller, massacres previously not recognized by the Pentagon, where at least 137 civilians have died. [1] Insurances may have occurred in other cases, as described in the Pulitzer Prize-winning series of Tiger Troops from the 101st Airborne Division by Toledo Blade in 2003. Vietnam, 1969-75
Richard Nixon has campaigned in the 1968 presidential election under the slogan that he will end the war in Vietnam and bring "peace with honor". However, there are no plans to do this, and America's commitment continues for another five years. The purpose of the American military effort is to buy time, gradually build up the forces of the South Vietnamese armed forces, and replenish them with modern weapons so they can defend their own country. This policy became the foundation of the so-called Nixon Doctrine. As applied to Vietnam, it is labeled Vietnamisasi.
Nixon's paper shows that in 1968, as presidential candidate, he ordered Anna Chennault, his contact with the South Vietnamese government, to persuade them to reject the truce brokered by President Lyndon Johnson. This action violates the Logan Act, prohibiting citizens from interfering in official government talks with foreign countries, and has been said to be a betrayal.
Soon after Tet, General Westmoreland was promoted to Army Chief of Staff and he was succeeded by his deputy General Creighton W. Abrams. Due to a change in the American strategy put forward by Vietnamis, Abrams takes a very different approach. The United States gradually withdraws from the conflict, and Abrams likes smaller operations aimed at PAVN/NLF logistics, more openness to the media, the use of indiscriminate American weapons, the removal of body counts as a key indicator of battlefield success, and more cooperation means with the South Vietnamese army.
However, Vietnam's warfare creates a dilemma for US troops: the strategy requires US troops to fight long enough for ARVs to increase enough to defend its own Communist forces. The spirit in the United States declined rapidly during 1969-1972, as evidenced by the decline in discipline, the deterioration of drug use among soldiers, and increased "cuts" of US officers by dissatisfied troops.
One of Nixon's major foreign policy objectives is the achievement of breakthroughs in US relations with the People's Republic of China and the Soviet Union. An internationally acclaimed anti-communist, Nixon can offer a diplomatic bid to the communists without being accused of being "soft against communism". The result of his offer was the dÃÆ' Â © tente era that led to the reduction of nuclear weapons by the US and USSR and the beginning of dialogue with China. In this context, Nixon views Vietnam as simply a limited conflict that forms part of a larger tapestry of superpower; However, he is still determined to preserve South Vietnam until then because he can not be blamed for what he sees as his inevitable collapse (or "worthy interval", as is known). To this end he and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger used Chinese and Soviet foreign policy policies to successfully defuse some anti-war opposition at home and secure the movement at negotiations that had begun in Paris.
China and the Soviet Union have been the main supporters of North Vietnam's efforts through large-scale military and financial aid. The two communist superpowers compete with each other to prove their "brotherly socialist relationship" with the regime in Hanoi. North Vietnam has become adept at playing two countries from each other. Even with Nixon's proximity, their support for North Vietnam increased significantly in the years leading up to US departure in 1973, allowing North Vietnam to carry out a full-scale conventional attack on the South, complete with tanks, heavy artillery and the most modern. surface-to-air missiles.
Pentagon Papers
The credibility of the US government suffered again in 1971 when The New York Times The Washington Post and other newspapers published the series The Pentagon Papers (actually < i> US-Vietnam Relations, 1945-1967 ). The secret history study of America's commitment in Vietnam, from the Franklin Roosevelt government to 1967, has been contracted by RAND Corporation by Defense Minister McNamara. The documents were leaked to the media by Daniel Ellsberg, a former State Department official who had worked on the research.
The Pentagon Papers laid down the mistakes taken by four administrations in their Vietnamese policy. For example, they expose Johnson's administration vagueness to Congress about the Gulf of Tonkin incident that has led to US direct intervention; they expose the Laos underground bombing that began in 1964; and they detail the involvement of the American government in NgÃÆ' 'deaths? ÃÆ'¬nh Di? m. This study presents a pessimistic view of the likelihood of victory and generates harsh criticism of US policy.
The importance of the actual content of the paper for US policy-making is debatable, but the window they provide into the flawed decision making process at the highest level of the US government opens the issue for other questions. Their publication is a government news and legal event (Nixon loses to the Supreme Court) and extra-legal efforts ("Plumber" at the psychiatrist's office Ellsberg commits to obtaining material to discredit him, is one of the first steps on the road to Watergate) done to prevent their publication - mainly on the basis of national security - then proceed to generate more criticism and suspicion from the government by the American public.
Cambodia Operation and campaign menu, 1969-70
In 1969 the policy of non-alignment and neutrality was thinning for Prince Sihanouk, the ruler of Cambodia. The pressure from the right in Cambodia caused the prince to start shifting from the pro-left position he assumed in 1965-1966. He started making offers for normal relations with the US and created the National Salvation Government with the help of pro-American General Lon Nol. Seeing the change of prince's position, President Nixon ordered the launch of a secret bombing campaign, targeted at the PAVN/NLF Base and sanctuaries along the eastern border of Cambodia.
On March 18, 1970, Sihanouk, who was abroad on a state visit, was ousted by the National Assembly vote and replaced by General Lon Nol. The Port of Cambodia was immediately closed for North Vietnamese military supplies, and the government demanded that the PAVN/NLF troops be removed from the border area within 72 hours. On March 29, 1970, Vietnam took its own actions and launched an attack on Cambodian soldiers. The power of the North Vietnamese quickly invaded most of eastern Cambodia reaching 15 miles (24 km) from Phnom Penh which allowed their Chinese-backed, Khmer Rouge allies to expand their power. Nixon ordered a military offensive to Cambodia by US and ARVN troops to destroy the PAVN/NLF shelter bordering South Vietnam and buy time for US withdrawals. During the Cambodia Campaign, US and ARVN troops discovered and removed or destroyed the massive logistical and intelligence transport in Cambodia.
The attack also triggered massive demonstrations on and closure of American campuses. The expansion of the conflict into Cambodia is seen as an extension of the conflict to other countries, nullifying Nixon's promises to eliminate war. During subsequent protests, four students were killed and scores were injured by the Ohio National Guardsmen during a demonstration at Kent State University. Two other students were killed at Jackson State University in Mississippi. In an effort to reduce opposition to US commitments, Nixon announced on October 12 that the US will attract 40,000 more troops from Vietnam before Christmas.
After the coup, Sihanouk arrived in Beijing, where he founded and led a government in exile, throwing his considerable personal support behind the Khmer Rouge, North Vietnam, and Laotian Pathet Lao.
Lam Son 719
In 1971 the US approved ARVN to carry out an offensive operation aimed at cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail in southeastern Laos. In addition to attacking the PAVN logistics system (which will gain time for US withdrawal), the attack will be a significant test for Vietnamization. Supported by US air and artillery support (American troops are banned from entering Laos), ARVN moves across the border along Route 9, utilizing the outpost of Marine Khe Sanh as a jumping point. At first, the invasion went well, but unlike the 1970 Cambodian operation, the PAVN decided to stand and fight, eventually gathering some 60,000 people on the battlefield.
North Vietnam first hit the ARVN column, destroyed its posts, and then moved to the main ARVN force. Unlike previous meetings during the conflict, PAVN fielded armored formations, heavy artillery, and a large number of the latest anti-aircraft artillery. After two months of fierce fighting, ARVN retreated across the border, chased by North Vietnamese. Half of the invading forces were killed or captured during the operation, and Vietnamization was seen as a failure.
On August 18, Australia and New Zealand decided to withdraw their troops from the conflict. The total number of US troops in South Vietnam fell to 196,700 on October 29, 1971, the lowest level since January 1966. On 12 November 1971, Nixon set a deadline of 1 February 1972 for the dismissal of 45,000 other soldiers.
Easter Attack
Vietnamization received another severe test in the spring of 1972 when North Vietnam launched a massive conventional assault on the Demilitarized Zone. Starting March 30th, the Easter Attack (known as Nguy? N Hu? Offensive for North Vietnam) quickly raided the three northernmost provinces of South Vietnam, including the provincial capital of Qu? Ng Tr? City. The PAVN troops then head south towards Hu ?.
Early April, PAVN opened two additional operations. The first, a thrust of three divisions supported by heavy tanks and artillery, advanced from Cambodia on 5 April. North Vietnam captured Loc Ninh and advanced to the provincial capital of An LÃ © c in BÃÆ'¬nh Long Province. The second new attack, launched from the three border regions to the Central Highlands, confiscated a complex of ARVN headquarters near Dak To and then advanced towards Kon Tum, threatening to divide the South Vietnamese into two.
The US responded with a buildup of American air power to support the ARVN defensive operations and to conduct Operation Linebacker, the first offensive bombing in North Vietnam since the Rolling Thunder was halted in 1968. The PAVN attack against Hu ?, An L? C, and Kon Tum contained and ARVN launched a counterattack in May to reclaim lost northern provinces. On September 10, the South Vietnamese flag once again flew over the ruins of Fortress Qu? Ng Tr? City, but the ARVN attack then exhausted, recognizing the rest of the occupied territory to North Vietnam. South Vietnam has avenged the heaviest attack since Tet, but it is very clear that it is entirely dependent on US air power for its survival. Meanwhile, the withdrawal of American troops, numbering less than 100,000 at the start of the year, resumed on schedule. In June only six remaining infantry battalions remain. On August 12, the last American ground combat division left the country. However, the US continues to operate the base in Long Binh. The combat patrol continued there until 11 November when the US handed over the base to South Vietnam. After this, only 24,000 American troops are left in Vietnam and President Nixon announces that they will stay there until all US POWs are released.
At the beginning of the North Vietnamese invasion, the media, including conservative commentator William F. Buckley, predicted the fall of the Republic of Vietnam; Buckley even called for the dismissal of General Creighton Abrams as incompetent military leader. But ARVN succeeded in defeating General Giap and his huge invading army. His troops crushed at the Battle of An L? C, where he threw some divisions into the entrenched southern Vietnamese army, eventually losing more than half his troops as casualties. General Giap's loss and subsequent retreats were seen as a major failure by the North Vietnamese Communist Party that made Giap exempt from his command. Although ARVN forces survive and fend off a massive PAVN attack on An LÃ © c, American air power seems to have been the key to the success of ARVN, just as it has been a key factor in supporting US ground forces when they were operating in South Vietnam before. until 1972. Thus, the withdrawal of US military support in 1973 and the passage of congressional resolutions that cut US funding for combat activities in Indochina (HR 9055 and HJRes.636) paved the way for the defeat of the Republic of Vietnam in 1975.
The 1972 Election and Operation Linebacker II
During the 1972 presidential election, the war once again became a major problem. An anti-war democrat, George McGovern, opposes President Nixon. The President ended Operation Linebacker Oct. 22 after a broken negotiation deadlock and a provisional agreement had been agreed by representatives of the US and North Vietnam at peace talks in Paris. US negotiating team chief Henry Kissinger declared that "peace is imminent" shortly before election day, handling death blows for the accursed McGovern campaign. However, Kissinger does not calculate the severity of the South Vietnamese President, Thieu, who refuses to accept the treaty and demands 90 changes in his text. This North Vietnamese refused to accept, and Nixon did not tend to put too much pressure on Thieu shortly before the election, although his victory was all but reassuring. The atmosphere between the US and the North faded as Hanoi announced details of the deal to the public. The Nixon Administration claims that North Vietnamese negotiators have used the statement as an opportunity to embarrass the President and weaken the United States. White House press secretary Ron Ziegler told the press on Nov. 30 that there would be no public announcement of the withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam since troop levels dropped to 27,000.
Because of Thieu's unhappiness with the agreement, especially the provision that the North Vietnamese troops could remain "in place" in the land of South Vietnam, the talks in Paris stalled because Hanoi refused to accept Thieu's change and responded with his own amendment. To convince Thieu of the American decision, Nixon ordered a massive bombing campaign against North Vietnam using the B-52 and tactical aircraft in Operation Linebacker II, which began on December 18 with a major attack on Hanoi and the port of Haiphong. Nixon justified his actions by blaming the deadlock in negotiations on North Vietnam, causing a commentator to describe his actions as "War with rage". Although this heavy bombing campaign caused protests, both domestically and abroad, and despite significant airplane losses over North Vietnam, Nixon continued operations until 29 December. He also pressured Thieu to accept the terms of the agreement reached in October.
Return to Paris
On January 15, 1973, citing progress in the peace negotiations, Nixon announced the suspension of all offensive measures against North Vietnam, which must be followed by a unilateral withdrawal from all US troops. The Paris Peace Treaty on "Ending the War and Restoring Peace in Vietnam" was signed on 27 January, formally ending the US direct involvement in the Vietnam War.
The agreement calls for the withdrawal of all US personnel and prisoner-of-war exchanges. In South Vietnam, a ceasefire was announced (overseen by the International Supervising Commission, 1,160 personnel) and both ARVN and PAVN/NLF troops would remain in control of the areas they occupy, effectively partitioning Southern Vietnam. Both sides pledged to work towards a compromise political solution, which might result in a coalition government. To maximize the territory under their control, the two sides in South Vietnam were almost immediately involved in a land grabbing military operation, which turned into a flash point. The signing of the Agreement was the primary motivation for the awarding of the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize to Henry Kissinger and for leading the North Vietnamese negotiator Le Duc Tho. A separate ceasefire has been installed in Laos in February. Five days before the signing of the treaty in Paris, President Lyndon Johnson, whose presidency has been tainted with Vietnam, died.
The first US war prisoners were released by North Vietnam on February 11, and all US military personnel were ordered to leave South Vietnam on 29 March. As an inducement to the Thieu government to sign the agreement, Nixon has promised that the US will provide financial assistance. and limited military support (in the form of air strikes) so that the South will not be mastered. But Nixon fought for his political life in the growing Watergate scandal and faces an increasingly hostile Congress that is holding back funding. The President was able to give little influence to the old society who was not friendly to the Vietnam War.
Thus, Nixon (or his successor Gerald Ford) could not fulfill his promises to Thieu. At the same time, aid to North Vietnam from the Soviet Union increased. Because the US is no longer involved, neither the US nor the Soviet Union no longer considers war as important to their relationship. The balance of power shifted firmly in support of North Vietnam, and the North then launched a major military offensive, the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, against the South that culminated in the handover of the Republic of Vietnam to the PAVN troops on 30 April 1975.
See also
References
External links
- Why Vietnam's Vietnam's Vietnamization Failed?
- Short film President John Kennedy's Press Conference in South Vietnam (1963) available for free download on the Internet Archive
- Short film Laos: The Not So Secret War (1970) is available for free download on the Internet Archive
- Short film Big Picture: Why Vietnam? available for free download on the Internet Archive
- Big Picture: Big Picture: Operation Montagnard is available for free download on the Internet Archive
- Big Picture: Big Picture: The Unique War is available for free download on the Internet Archive
- Short film Big Picture: US Army Advisor in Vietnam available for free download on the Internet Archive
Unclassified Key Resources
Department of Defense
Office of the Secretary of Defense & amp; Joint Staff, FOIA Requesting Service Center
- Vietnamese & amp; Southeast Asia (very large document collection)
NSA
- Important: History of the Cryptography of the Vietnam People's Army 1945-1975. (1994)
- Tonkin Bay record
CIA
- The CIA and the Generals, Covert Support for the Military Government in South Vietnam
- The CIA and House of Ngo, Covert Action in Southern Vietnam
Source of the article : Wikipedia
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