The cause of World War I remains a controversial and contentious question. World War I started in the Balkans at the end of July 1914 and ended in November 1918, leaving 17 million people dead and 20 million wounded.
Long-term scholars seeking to explain why two competing devices - Germany and Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and Russia, France, and Great Britain on the other - became a conflict in 1914. They looked at factors such as political conflict , region and economy, militarism, complex alliance and alliance networks, imperialism, the growth of nationalism, and the emptiness of power created by the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Other important long-term or structural factors that are often studied include unresolved territorial disputes, the balance of power balance in Europe, tangled and fragmented governance, arms competitions from previous decades, and military planning.
Scholars conducted a short-term analysis focused on the summer of 1914, asking if the conflict could be stopped, or whether the conflict was out of control. The immediate cause lies in the decisions made by statesmen and generals during the July Crisis of 1914. The crisis was triggered by the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria by a Bosnian Serb who had been supported by a nationalist organization in Serbia. The crisis escalated when the conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia came to involve Russia, Germany, France, and finally Belgium and Great Britain. Other factors that came into play during the diplomatic crisis that preceded the war included misperception of intent (eg, German belief that Britain would remain neutral), the fatalism that war was unavoidable, and the speed of the crisis, exacerbated by delays and misunderstandings in diplomatic communications.
The crisis followed a series of diplomatic clashes between the Great Powers (Italy, France, Germany, England, Austria-Hungary, and Russia) on European and colonial issues in the decades before 1914 which caused tensions. In turn, this public clash can be traced to changes in the balance of power in Europe since 1867.
The consensus on the origin of war remains elusive because historians disagree on the key factors, and place different emphases on various factors. This is exacerbated by changing historical arguments over time, in particular the delayed availability of classified historical records. The deepest difference among historians is between those who focus on the actions of Germany and Austria-Hungary as the key and those who focus on the broader group of actors. Secondary fault lines exist among those who believe that Germany deliberately planned the European war, those who believed that the war was ultimately unplanned but still caused mainly by Germany and Austria-Hungary took risks, and those who believed that either all or part of that Other powers, namely Russia, France, Serbia, and Great Britain, played a more significant role in causing war than those traditionally suggested.
Video Causes of World War I
European Polarization, 1887-1914
To understand the long-term origins of the war in 1914, it is important to understand how the forces are shaped into two competing devices, sharing the same goals and enemies. These two sets became, in August 1914, Germany and Austria-Hungary on one side and Russia, France, Serbia, and Great Britain on the other.
German re-alignment to Austria-Hungary and Russian re-alignment to France, 1887-1892
In 1887, the German and German alignment was secured with a Secret Reinsurance secrets arranged by Otto von Bismarck. However, in 1890 the treaty was allowed to fall in favor of the Double Alliance (1879) between Germany and Austria-Hungary. In response, Russia secured the Franco-Russian Alliance in 1892, which would last until 1917.
France's fickle foreign policy towards Germany
Some of the distant origins of World War I can be seen in the results and consequences of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71 and the simultaneous unification of Germany. Germany has won convincingly and established a powerful Empire, while France has fallen into turmoil and military setbacks for years. The legacy of hostility grew between France and Germany after the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. Annexation caused widespread anger in France, giving rise to a desire for revenge, known as revanchism. French sentiment wants military and territorial revenge and the displacement of France as a leading continental military force. Bismarck is wary of France's desire for revenge; he achieved peace by isolating France and balancing the Austrian-Hungarian and Russian ambitions in the Balkans. During his last years he tried to calm France by encouraging overseas expansion. However, anti-German sentiment remained.
France finally recovered from its defeat, paid for its war reparations, and rebuilt its military power again. But it's smaller than Germany in terms of population and industry, and thus feels insecure next to its stronger neighbors.
English juxtaposition of France and Russia, 1898-1907: The Triple Entente
After Bismarck's abolition in 1890, France's attempt to isolate Germany became a success. With the formation of the Triple Entente, Germany began to feel under siege. The French Foreign Minister, ThÃÆ'  © ophile Delcassà ©  ©, in particular, is anxious to woo Russia and Great Britain. The main markers were the French-Russian Alliance of 1894, Entra Cordiale in 1904 with Great Britain, and finally Entou Anglo-Russia in 1907 which became the Three Entente. This formal alliance with Russia, and an informal alignment with Britain, against Germany and Austria finally brought Russia and Britain into World War I as a French ally.
Britain abandoned its solitary policy of continental power, called "Beautiful Isolation", in 1900 after being isolated during the Boer War. Britain terminated the agreement, limited to colonial affairs, with its two main colonial rivals, the Entente Cordiale with France in 1904 and the Entou Anglo-Russia of 1907. Some historians see the British alignment as a principle of reaction to Germany's strict foreign policy and its accumulation. its navy from 1898 which led to an Anglo-German naval arms race. Other scholars, especially Niall Ferguson, argued that Britain chose France and Russia over Germany because Germany was too weak as an ally to provide an effective counterweight to other forces and could not provide the British imperial security achieved by the entente agreement. In the words of British diplomat, Arthur Nicolson, "it is far less profitable for us to have French and Russian unfriendly than unfriendly Germans". Ferguson argued that the British Government rejected the alliance of the German alliance "not because Germany began to pose a threat to Britain, but, on the contrary because they realized that he posed no threat". The impact of the Triple Entente therefore doubles, to improve English relations with France and its Russian allies and to degrade the importance of British good relations with Germany. It was not "an antagonism against Germany that led to isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and increased hostility toward the German Empire."
The Triple Entente between Britain, France and Russia is often compared to the Three Alliances between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, but historians are reminiscent of comparison. The Entente, in contrast to the Alliance of Three or the Franco-Russian Alliance, was not a mutual defense alliance and Britain therefore felt free to make its own foreign policy decisions in 1914. As the British Foreign Office Eyre Crowe said: "Fundamental The fact is, of course is that Entente is not an alliance For the purposes of the last emergency it can be found to have no substance at all.For Entente is nothing more than a frame of mind, a policy view commonly shared by governments of two countries, but who may, or be, very unclearly lose all content. "
A series of diplomatic incidents between 1905 and 1914 increased the tension between the Great Forces and strengthened existing alignments, beginning with the First Moroccan Crisis.
Morocco's First Crisis, 1905-06: Strengthening Entente
The First Moroccan Crisis (also known as Tangier Crisis) was an international crisis between March 1905 and May 1906 over Moroccan status. The crisis exacerbated German relations with France and Britain, and helped ensure the success of the new Anglo-French Entente Cordiale. In the words of the historian Christopher Clark "The Anglo-French Entente is strengthened rather than weakened by the German challenge to France in Morocco".
Bosnia Crisis, 1908: Deterioration of Russian and Serbian relations with Austria-Hungary
In 1908 Austria-Hungary announced its annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two provinces in the Balkan region of Europe previously under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Although Bosnia and Herzegovina were still nominally under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire in 1908, Austria-Hungary had been managing the provinces since the Berlin Congress in 1878, when the great powers of Europe gave it the right to occupy both provinces, with the legal right to remain along with Turkey. The announcement in October 1908 of the Austro-Hungarian annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina disrupted the delicate balance of power in the Balkans, which envied Serbian and pan-Slavic nationalists throughout Europe. Although the attenuated Russia is forced to submit, its contempt, its foreign office still considers Austria-Hungary action as too aggressive and threatening. The Russian response was to encourage pro-Russian, anti-Austrian sentiment in Serbia and other Balkan provinces, provoking Austrian fears of Slavic expansionism in the region. Agadir's crisis in Morocco, 1911
The imperial rivalry prompted France, Germany and Britain to compete for control over Morocco, leading to the fears of a short-lived war in 1911. In the end France established a protectorate on Morocco that heightened European tensions. The crisis of Agadir was an international tension sparked by the deployment of a large army of French troops in the interior of Morocco in April 1911. Germany reacted by sending the SMS of the Panther warship to the port of Morocco Agadir on July 1, 1911. The main result was the suspicion that deeper between London and Berlin, and closer military ties between London and Paris.
Instead of scaring England into shifting to Germany, increased fear and hostility drew England closer to France. Britain's support from France during the crisis strengthened the Entente between the two countries (and with Russia as well), increasing the Anglo-German rug, deepening the split that would peak in 1914. In terms of internal British brothers, the crisis was part of five struggles over the years in in the British cabinet between radical isolationists and the Liberal Party's imperial interventionists. Interventionists try to use Triple Entente to load German expansion. Radicals obtained approval for official cabinet approval of all initiatives that might lead to war. But the interventionists were joined by two prominent Radicals, David Lloyd George and Winston Churchill. Lloyd's famous "House House speech" on July 21, 1911 angered the Germans and encouraged France. In 1914 interventionists and Radicals agreed to share responsibility for decisions that culminated in the declaration of war, and thus the decision was almost unanimous.
Significantly for the events of August 1914, the crisis caused British Foreign Secretary Edward Gray and France to make a naval secret agreement in which the Royal Navy vowed to protect the northern coast of France from the German assault while France concentrated its fleet on the western Mediterranean and agreed to protect the interests England there. Thus France was able to maintain its communications with the colonies of North Africa, and Britain to concentrate more power in the home waters against the German High Sea Fleet. The Cabinet was not informed of this treaty until August 1914. Meanwhile, the episode reinforced the hand of Admiral Tirpitz who called for a very rising Navy, and earned it in 1912.
Italo-Turkish War: Ottoman Waivers, 1911 -12
In the Italo-Turkish War or the Turco-Italian War, Italy defeated the Ottoman Empire in North Africa in 1911-12. Italy easily seized important coastal cities but its troops failed to advance deep inland. Italy seizes Ottoman Tripolitania Vilayet (province), where the most famous sub-provinces (sanjaks) are Fezzan, Cyrenaica, and Tripoli itself. These regions together form what is known as Libya Italy. The significance for the First World War was that this war made it clear that no Great Power seemed to want to support the Ottoman Empire any longer and this paved the way for the Balkan Wars. Christopher Clark states: "Italy launched a conquest of war in the African province of the Ottoman Empire, which triggered a chain of opportunistic attacks on the Ottoman territory throughout the Balkans, a geographical balance system that allows buried local conflicts to be wiped out."
Balkan Wars, 1912-13: The growth of Serbian and Russian forces
The Balkan Wars are two conflicts that occurred in the Balkan Peninsula in southeastern Europe in 1912 and 1913. The four Balkan states defeated the Ottoman Empire in the first war; one of four, Bulgaria, was defeated in the second war. The Ottoman Empire lost almost all its holdings in Europe. Austria-Hungary, though not a fighter, was weakened because of the enlarged Serbians pushing the union of the Southern Slavs community.
The Balkan Wars of 1912-1913 increased the international tension between the Russian Empire and Austria-Hungary. It also led to the strengthening of Serbia and the weakening of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, which may have made Serbia under control, thus disrupting the balance of power in Europe in favor of Russia.
Russia initially agreed to avoid a territorial change, but later in 1912 supported Serbia's request for an Albanian port. The London Conference of 1912-13 agreed to establish an independent Albanian; But Serbia and Montenegro refused to comply. After Austria, and then internationally, a naval demonstration in early 1912 and a withdrawal of Russian support, Serbia withdrew. Montenegro is not appropriate and on May 2, the Austrian ministerial council met and decided to give Montenegro the last chance to comply and, if not, then to take military action. However, seeing Austrian military preparations, Montenegro requested the ultimatum be postponed and obeyed.
The Serbian government, having failed to get Albania, is now demanding that the first bootable Balkan I war could be replaced, and Russia failing to pressure Serbia to retreat. Serbs and Greeks allied against Bulgaria, who responded with preemptive attacks against their troops, starting the Second Balkan War. The Bulgarian army was destroyed quickly when Turkey and Romania joined the war.
The Balkan war stiffens the German/Austro-Hungarian alliance. The German government's response to Austria's support request for Serbia was initially divided and inconsistent. After the German Imperial War Council of December 8, 1912, it was clear that Germany was not ready to support Austria-Hungary in the war against Serbia and its likely allies.
In addition, German diplomacy before, during, and after the Second Balkan War was pro-Greek and pro-Romanian and contrary to the increasingly pro-Bulgarian Austro-Hungarian view. The result was a tremendous damage to the Austria-Germany relations. Austrian Foreign Minister Leopold von Berchtold told German ambassador Heinrich von Tschirschky in July 1913 that "Austria-Hungary may also belong to another group" for all of Berlin's good has ".
In September 1913, it was learned that Serbia moved to Albania and Russia did nothing to hold it, while the Serbian government did not guarantee to respect Albanian territorial integrity and suggested there would be some border modifications. In October 1913, the council of ministers decided to send a warning Serb followed by an ultimatum: that Germany and Italy were informed of some actions and solicited support, and that spies were sent to report if there were actual withdrawals. Serbia responded to the warning with rebellion and the Ultimatum departed on 17 October and was accepted the next day. He demanded that Serbia evacuate the territory of Albania within eight days. Serbia complied, and Kaiser made a congratulatory visit to Vienna to try to fix some of the damage done earlier in the year.
By this time, Russia has largely recovered from its defeat in the Russian-Japanese War, and German and Austrian calculations are fueled by fears that Russia will eventually become too strong to be challenged. Their conclusion is that any war with Russia must happen in the next few years in order to have a chance of success.
Franco-Russian Alliance changed: Beginning Balkan scenario , 1911-1913
The original Franco-Russian alliance was formed to protect France and Russia from German attacks. In the event of such an attack, the two countries will mobilize simultaneously, placing Germany under the threat of a two-pronged war. However, there are limits placed on the alliance that are essentially defensive.
Throughout the 1890s and 1900s, the French and the Russians clarified the boundaries of the alliance did not extend to the provocations caused by the adventurous foreign policy of others. For example, Russia warned France that the alliance would not operate if France provoked Germany in North Africa. Similarly, the French insisted on Russia that they should not use alliances to provoke Austria-Hungary or Germany in the Balkans, and that France does not recognize in the Balkans a vital strategic importance for France or for Russia.
In the last 18 to 24 months before the outbreak of war, this changed. At the end of 1911 and especially during the Balkans' own war in 1912-13, the French view changed. France now accepts the importance of the Balkans to Russia. In addition, France clearly states that if, as a result of the conflict in the Balkans, war will break out between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, France will stand by Russia. Thus the Franco-Russian alliance changes in character, and by the consequences of Serbia becomes a prominent security for Russia and France. When they buy the future scenario of the Balkan war, regardless of who initiated such a war, the alliance will continue to respond. This will see this conflict as casus foederis: as a trigger for the alliance. Christopher Clark describes this change as "a very important development in the pre-war system that enabled the 1914 events".
The Liman von Sanders "Affair" 1913-14
This was a crisis caused by the appointment of German officer Liman von Sanders to lead the First Turkish Army Corps guarding Constantinople, and further Russian objections. The "Liman von Sanders Affair," began on November 10, 1913, when Russia's foreign minister Sergei Sazonov instructed the Russian ambassador in Berlin, Sergei Sverbeev, to inform Germany that the von Sanders mission, to be regarded by Russia as a "actions that are openly hostile." In addition to threatening Russia's foreign trade, half of which flows through the Turkish strait, the mission increases the likelihood of a German-led Turkish attack on Russian Black Sea ports and Russia's threatened plans for expansion in eastern Anatolia.
The appointment of Liman brought a storm of protests from Russia, which suspects German design in the Ottoman capital. A compromise arrangement was then agreed upon in which Liman was appointed to a somewhat less senior (and less influential) Inspector General position in January 1914.
As a result of the crisis, Russia's weakness in military power prevailed. The Russians can not rely on their financial means as a tool for foreign policy.
Anglo-German dà © Å © tente, 1912-14
Historians recall that, if combined, the previous crisis should not be seen as an argument that the European war was inevitable in 1914.
Significantly, the British-German Navy racing ended in 1912. In April 1913, Britain and Germany signed treaties on the African territories of the Portuguese empire that were expected to collapse in the near future. In addition, Russia threatened British interests in Persia and India to the extent that in 1914, there were signs that the British cooled their ties with Russia and that understanding with Germany might be useful. The English were "deeply troubled by the failure of St Petersburg to abide by the terms of the treaty agreed in 1907 and begin to feel such arrangements with Germany might serve as useful corrections."
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria, the alleged heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, and his wife Sophie, Duchess of Hohenberg, were shot dead by two gun shots in Sarajevo by Gavrilo Princip, one of a group of six assassins (five Serbs and a Bosniak) coordinated by Danilo Ili, a Bosnian Serb and a member of Black Hand's secret society.
The assassination was important because it was perceived by Austria-Hungary as an existential challenge for him and in his view gave the casus belli with Serbia. The Austrian Emperor Franz Joseph was 84 years old, so the murder of his heirs, so quickly before he was likely to hand over the crown, was seen as a direct challenge to the Austrian government. Many ministers in Austria, especially Berchtold, think this action should be avenged. Moreover, Archduke, which has been the decisive voice for peace in previous years, has now been removed from discussions. The killing sparked the July Crisis, which turned local conflict into a European war, and then the world.
Austria Austria towards war with Serbia
The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the heir to the Austrian throne, sent a deep shock wave through the Austrian elite, and the murder was described as "a 9/11 effect, a terrorist event filled with historic significance, transforming political chemistry in Vienna."
Although they were not personally close, Emperor Franz Joseph was very surprised and annoyed. It quickly emerged that the three main members of the killing squad had spent a long time in Belgrade, had just crossed the border from Serbia, and were carrying Serb-made weapons and bombs. They are secretly sponsored by the Black Hand, whose aims include the release of all Bosnian slaves from the Austrian government, and orchestrated by the Serbian Military Intelligence Chief, Apis.
Two days after the assassination, Foreign Minister Berchtold and the Emperor agreed that the "policy of patience" with Serbia was over. Austria worries if it shows weakness, their neighbors to the South and East will be brave, while the war with Serbia will end the problems experienced by a double monarchy with Serbia. Chief of Staff Franz Conrad von HÃÆ'¶tzendorf stated Serbia: "If you have a toxic rider on your heels, you wet his head, you are not waiting for a bite."
There is also a sense that the moral effects of military action will breathe new life into the tired structure of the Habsburg monarchy, returning it to the power and virility of the imagined past, and that Serbia should be tackled before it becomes too powerful to lose militarily. The main voices for peace in previous years included Franz Ferdinand himself. His dismissal not only provides casus belli but also removes one of the most prominent pigeons from policy making.
Since taking Serbia involved the risk of war with Russia, Vienna seeks a view of Berlin. Germany provided their unconditional support for the war with Serbia, called "Empty Checks." Supported by German support, Austria began to compose an ultimatum, giving the Serbs forty-eight hours to respond to ten demands. Austria hopes that the ultimatum will be rejected to give the pretext of war with neighbors they consider unstable.
Samuel R. Williamson, Jr. has emphasized the role of Austria-Hungary in starting the war. Convinced that Serbian nationalism and the ambition of the Russian Balkans destroyed the Empire, Austria-Hungary hoped for a limited war against Serbia and Germany's strong support would force Russia to prevent war and undermine the prestige of the Balkans.
At this stage in the crisis, the likelihood of Russia's prescribed support for Serbia, and its risks, was never well weighed. The Austrians remained fixated on the Serbs but did not decide on their exact destination other than war.
However, after deciding the war with German support, Austria was slow to act openly, and did not give an ultimatum until July 23, about three weeks after the June 28 killing. Thus Austria lost the sympathy of reflexes who attended Sarajevo's assassination and gave further impression to the Entente powers that Austria only used murder as a pretext for aggression.
"Empty Check" - - Germany supports Austria-Hungary, 6 July
On July 6, Germany gave unconditional support to its ally Austria-Hungary in its dispute with Serbia - the so-called "blank checks". Responding to support requests, Vienna notified Kaiser's position is that, if Austria-Hungary "recognizes the necessity of taking military measures against Serbia, he will deplore we are not taking advantage of this moment which is very profitable for us... we may in this case, like others, rely on German support "
The idea is that Austria-Hungary is the only German ally, if its prestige is not restored, its position in the Balkans may be irreparably damaged, prompting further irredentism by Serbia and Romania. Rapid battles against Serbia will not only obliterate them, but may also lead to further diplomatic gains vis a vis of Bulgaria and Romania. The defeat of Serbia will also be a defeat for Russia and reduce its influence in the Balkans.
The benefits are clear but there is a risk, namely that Russia will intervene and this will lead to continental wars. However, this is considered more unlikely because Russia has not completed a French-funded weapons program scheduled for completion in 1917. In addition, they do not believe that Russia, as an absolute monarchy, will support the government, and more broadly "moods across Europe very anti-Serbian that even Russia will not intervene. "Personal factors are also very burdensome and the German Kaiser is close to Franz Ferdinand who was killed and influenced by his death, to the extent that German detention against vis vis Serbia in 1913 turned into an aggressive stance.
On the other hand, the military thinks that if Russia intervenes then St Petersburg clearly wants war and now will be a better time to fight, when Germany has secured allies in Austria-Hungary, Russia is not ready and Europe sympathetic to them.. On balance, at this point in a crisis, Germany anticipates that their support will mean war will be a local affair between Austria-Hungary and Serbia. This would be especially true if Austria moved quickly, "while other European powers are still disgusted over the killings and therefore tend to be sympathetic to any action taken by Austria-Hungary."
Fermetà ©  © - France supports Russia, July 20-23
French President Raymond PoincarÃÆ'Â © arrived at St. Petersburg for a state visit on July 20 and departing on July 23rd. Because the breakup of Austrian, Russian and French codes is aware of Austria's upcoming ultimatum and their encounter is centered on the crisis in central Europe.
France and Russia agreed that their alliance was expanded to support Serbia against Austria, which underscores the existing policy behind the early Balkan scenario. As Christopher Clark puts it, "Poincare has come to preach the gospel of assertiveness and his words have fallen to the ready-to-ears.Compassion in this context means a violent opposition to every Austrian action against Serbia.No pointless sources suggest that Poincare or His Russian counterpart gives any thought what action the Austrian-Hungary can legally accept to be taken after the murder. "
On July 21, Russia's Foreign Minister warned Germany's ambassador to Russia that "Russia will not be able to tolerate Austria-Hungary using language threatening to Serbia or taking military steps." The leaders in Berlin discounted the threat of this war. German foreign minister Gottlieb von Jagow noted "there must be some bluff in St. Petersburg." German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg told his assistant that Britain and France were unaware that Germany would fight if Russia was mobilized. He thinks London sees German "snapping" and responds with "counterbluff." Political scientist James Fearon argues from this episode that Germany believes Russia expressed greater verbal support for Serbia than they actually provided, to pressure the Germans and Austrians-Hungarians to accept some of Russia's demands in negotiations. Meanwhile, Berlin downplayed the real strong support for Vienna not to emerge the aggressor, as it would alienate the German socialists. Austria-Hungary presents Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, July 23
On July 23, Austria-Hungary, after their own investigation of the killings, sent an ultimatum to Serbia, which contained their demands, giving them forty-eight hours to obey.
Russia mobilizes - Crisis rises, 24 -25 July
On July 24-25, the Russian Council of Ministers met, and in response to the crisis and despite the fact that he had no alliance with Serbia, agreed to partial secret mobilization of over a million people from the Russian Army and the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet. It needs to be emphasized, as this is the cause of some confusion in the general narrative of the war, that this was done before Serbia's rejection of the ultimatum, the declaration of the Austrian war on July 28 or the military measures taken by Germany. As a diplomatic move, it has limited value because Russia did not make this public mobilization until 28 July.
The arguments used to support this step in the Council of Ministers are:
- Crisis is used as an excuse by Germany to increase their power
- The acceptance of the ultimatum will mean that Serbia will become an Austrian protectorate
- Russia has retreated in the past - for example in the affairs of Liman von Sanders and the Bosnian Crisis - and this has pushed Germany instead of calming them down
- Russian weapons have recovered considerably since the disaster of 1904-06
In addition, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov believes that war is inevitable and refuses to acknowledge that Austria-Hungary has the right to counter measures in the face of Serbian irredentism. In contrast, Sazonov has aligned himself with irredentism, and expects the fall of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Importantly, the French have given clear support to their Russian allies for a strong response in a recent state visit a few days earlier. Also in the background is Russia's anxiety about the future of the Turkish strait - "where Russian control of the Balkans will put Saint Petersburg in a much better position to prevent unwanted intrusions at the Bosphorus"
The policy was intended to be a mobilization against the Austrian-Hungarians alone. However, due to Russia's incompetence, Russia realized on July 29 that partial mobilization was impossible militarily, and because it would interfere with general mobilization, only full mobilization could prevent all operations being damaged. Therefore Russia moved into full mobilization on 30 July.
Christopher Clark stated "It would be difficult to overstate the importance of history from the 24th and 25th July meetings" and "In taking these steps, [Russian Foreign Minister] Sazonov and his colleagues step up the crisis and greatly increase the likelihood of common Europeans. things, pre-Russian mobilization transformed political chemistry in Serbia, so it is inconceivable that the Belgrade government, which initially gave serious consideration to receiving an ultimatum, would retreat in the face of Austrian pressure, the pressure on the Russian government... it sounded alarm bells in Austria- Hungary, most important of all, these measures drastically increased the pressure on Germany, which so far has not made military preparations and still relies on the localization of Austro- Serbian Conflict. " Serbia refuses ultimatum, Austria declares war on Serbia 25-28 July >
Serbia was originally considered to accept all the provisions of the Austrian ultimatum before news of Russia about the steps of pre mobilization sharpened their resolve.
The Serbs drafted their answer to the ultimatum in such a way that it gave the impression of making a significant concession but, as Christopher Clark said "In reality, then, this is a very fragrant rejection of most points". In response to the rejection of the ultimatum, Austria immediately broke off diplomatic ties on July 25 and declared war on July 28.
Russia - general mobilization ordered, 29 -30 July
On July 29, 1914, the Tsar ordered full mobilization, then changed his mind after receiving a telegram from Kaiser Wilhelm. Partial mobilization is ordered instead. The next day, the Tsar's foreign minister Sergey Sazonov once again persuaded Nicholas about the need for general mobilization, and the order was issued on that day, 30 July.
Christopher Clark states: "The general mobilization of Russia is one of the most important decisions of the July crisis.This is the first of the general mobilization.It came at a time when the German government has not even declared the coming War Country"
Why did Russia do this?
- In response to the declaration of the Austrian war on 28 July.
- Partial mobilization previously reserved does not match future public mobilization
- Sazonov's conviction that the harshness of Austria is Germany's policy, and therefore given that Germany drove Austria, there is no point in mobilizing Austria just
- France repeats its support for Russia, and there is an important reason to think that Britain will also support Russia
German mobilization and war with Russia and France, 1-3 August
On July 28, Germany learned through its spy network that Russia has implemented "Period Preparatory to War". Germany assumes that Russia has, after all, declared war and that its mobilization is endangering Germany. This doubled because the German war plan, called Schlieffen's Plan, relied on Germany to mobilize quickly enough to defeat France first (by attacking mostly through neutral Belgium) before turning to defeat the slower-moving Russia.
Christopher Clarke states: "The German effort in mediation - which suggests that Austria must" Stop in Belgrade "and use the occupation of the Serbian capital to ensure its requirements are met - was made futile by the speed of Russia's preparations, which threatened to force the Germans to take retaliatory action before mediation can come into force "
Thus, in response to Russian mobilization, Germany ordered the state of the Danger of the Near War (SIDW) on July 31, and when the Russian government refused to cancel the mobilization order, Germany mobilized and declared war on Russia on August 1. Given the Franco-Russian alliance, the countermeasures by France, correctly, are assumed to be inevitable and Germany therefore declared war on France on 3 August 1914.
English England declared war on Germany, August 4, 1914
After the neutral German invasion of Belgium, Britain issued an ultimatum to Germany on August 2 that it had to retreat or face war. The Germans did not obey and the British declared war on Germany on August 4, 1914.
The British reason for declaring war is complicated. The real reason given was that Britain was asked to maintain Belgian neutrality under the London Treaty of 1839. The German invasion of Belgium was, therefore, the casus belli and, importantly, legitimizing and promoting popular support for war.
The strategic risks posed by the German control over the Belgian coast and finally France are considered unacceptable. German guarantees of post-war behavior were cast into doubt by the blasÃÆ'Â © Â © treatment of Belgian neutrality. However, the London Agreement of 1839 did not bind Britain alone to maintain Belgian neutrality. In addition, sea war planning shows that Britain itself will breach Belgium's neutrality by blocking its ports (to prevent imported goods passing to Germany) in case of war with Germany.
In contrast, Britain's relations with its Entente partners, both France and Russia, are equally important. Edward Gray argues that a naval secret agreement with France (although they have not been approved by the Cabinet) creates a moral obligation vis a vis English and French.
Moreover, if the English leave the Entente friends, it is feared that if Germany wins the war, or Entente wins without British support, then, however, England will be left without a friend. This will make Britain and its Empire vulnerable to attack.
British Foreign Office Eyre Crowe mandarin states:
"If the war comes, and Britain stands beside, one of two things must happen. (A) Either Germany and Austria win, destroy France and insult Russia What will be the unfriendly British position (b) Or France and Russia won.What will be their attitude towards England? What about India and the Mediterranean? "
Domestically, the Liberal Cabinet is split and if war is not announced, the Government will fall when Prime Minister Asquith, Edward Gray and Winston Churchill insist that they will resign. In that event, the existing Liberal Cabinet will lose their jobs. Because the possibility of a Conservative pro-war will be elected to power this will cause the inclusion of Britain a little late into the war in any case, so cabinet ministers may also be motivated by a desire to avoid their selfless party splits and sacrifice their jobs.
Maps Causes of World War I
Domestic political factors
German domestic politics
Left-wing parties, especially the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), made great gains in the 1912 German elections. The German government at the time was still dominated by Prussian Junkers who feared the emergence of these left-wing parties. Fritz Fischer famously argues that they deliberately seek external war to distract the population and prepare patriotic support for the government. Indeed, one of the German military leaders Moritz von Lynker, the head of the military cabinet, liked the war in 1909 because "it is desirable to escape from difficulties at home and abroad." Conservative Party leader Ernst von Heydebrand und der Lasa stated that "war will strengthen the patriarchal order".
Other authors argue that German conservatives are ambivalent about war, worrying that losing the war will have catastrophic consequences, and even a successful war might alienate the population if it is long or difficult.
Austro-Hungarian policy drivers
The argument that Austro-Hungarian is a near-death political entity, whose omission is only a matter of time, is mobilized by unfriendly contemporaries to show that the imperial attempt to maintain its integrity during the last years before the war was in some ways invalid.
Clark states: "Evaluating the prospects of the Austo-Hungarian empire on the eve of the first world war faces us in an acute way with the problem of temporal perspective.... The collapse of the empire in the midst of war and defeat in 1918 impressed itself on the retrospective view of the Habsburg lands, the inauguration of an imminent and inevitable setback. "
It is true that in Austro-Hungary, the political stage of the last few decades before the war was increasingly dominated by the struggle for national rights among the eleventh official teams - Germany, Hungary, Czech, Slovakia, Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Romania, Ruthenians, Poland, and Italy. But before 1914, radical nationalists seeking full separation from the empire were still in a small minority and the roots of Austro-Hungarian political upheaval became less deep than suggested.
In fact, during the pre-war decade, the Habsburg lands went through a phase of strong economic growth with a similar increase in general prosperity. Most of the imperial population is associated with the state of Habsburg with the advantages of orderly governance, public education, welfare, sanitation, rule of law, and sophisticated maintenance of infrastructure.
Christopher Clark states: "Prosperity and a relatively good administration, the empire, like its human sovereignty, exhibits strange stability amidst the turmoil The crisis comes and goes without appearing to threaten the existence of such a system.The situation is always, as it happened in Vienna. Kraus quipped, 'desperate but not serious'. "
Driver from Serbian Policy
The prime mover of Serbian policy was to consolidate the Russian-backed expansion of Serbia during the Balkan war of 1912-13 and achieve a larger Serbian dream, which included the "unification" of land with a large Serbian ethnic population within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. , including Bosnia
This overlaying is a culture of extreme nationalism, and the killing cult, stems from the massacre of the Ottoman Sultans as a heroic epilogue to the unfavorable Battle of Kosovo on 28 June 1389. Clark stated: "Greater Serbian vision is not just a question of government policy, however, or even propaganda that is deeply intertwined into the culture and identity of the Serbs ".
Serbian policy is complicated by the fact that the main actor in 1914 was the official Serbian government headed by Nikola Pa? I? and the terrorist "Black Hands" led by the Serbian Military Intelligence Chief, known as Apis. The Black Hand believes that the Greater Serbia will be achieved by provoking a war with Austro-Hungary through acts of terror which, with Russian support, will be won.
The official position of the government was to focus on the consolidation of profits made during the Balkan war, and to avoid further conflict, as recent wars have exhausted the Serbian state. However, the official policy is silenced by political necessity simultaneously and tacitly supports the dream of the Serbian state in the long run. The Serbian government finds it impossible to lay down and end the Black Hand's machinations for fear it will be overthrown. Clark stated: "The Serbian authorities are partially unwilling and some can not suppress the irredentist activity that has led to murder in the first place"
Russia, in its part, tends to support Serbia as a fellow Slav country and regards Serbia as its "client". Russia also encourages Serbia to focus its irredentism against Austro-Hungary because it will prevent conflicts between Serbia and Bulgaria (another prospective Russian ally) in Macedonia.
Imperialism
The impact of competition and colonial aggression in Europe in 1914
Imperial rivalries, and the consequences of imperial security seeking or imperial expansion, have important consequences for the origin of the First World War.
The imperial rivalry between France, Britain, Russia and Germany played an important role in the creation of the Triple Entente and the relative isolation of Germany. Imperial opportunism, in the form of an Italian offensive in the Ottoman Ottoman province, also prompted the Balkan war of 1912-13, which changed the balance of power in the Balkans to the detriment of Austro-Hungary.
Some historians, such as Margaret MacMillan, believe that Germany created its own diplomatic isolation in Europe partly through an aggressive and insignificant imperialist policy known as Weltpolitik. Others, such as Clark, believe that German isolation is an undesirable consequence of dÃÆ' Â © tente between Britain, France and Russia. This tente was driven by Britain's desire for imperial security in relation to France in North Africa and in relation to Russia in Persia and India.
Either way, this isolation is important to the cause of WW1 as it leaves Germany with few options but to ally itself stronger with Austro-Hungary, which ultimately leads to unconditional support for Austrian penalties against Serbia during the July 1914 crisis.
German Isolation: The Consequences of Weltpolitik?
The German Chancellor in the 1870s and 1880s Otto von Bismarck did not like the idea of ​​a foreign kingdom. In contrast Bismarck supported French colonialism in Africa for diverting attention and government resources from continental Europe and post-1870 revanchism. Germany's "New Course" in foreign affairs, called "Weltpolitik" ("world policy") was adopted in the 1890s after dismissal Bismarck.
Weltpolitik's goal is to transform Germany into a global power through tough diplomacy, the acquisition of overseas colonies, and the development of a large navy.
Some historians, notably MacMillan and Hew Strachan, believe that the consequences of the Weltpolitik policy and the associated firmness are isolating Germany.
Weltpolitik, especially as expressed in German objections to the growing French influence in Morocco in 1904 and 1907, also helped to strengthen the Three Entente. The British-German Navy race also isolated Germany by reinforcing British preferences for agreements with German, French and Russian continental rivals.
German Isolation: The Consequences of a Triple Entente?
Historians, including Ferguson and Clark, believe that German isolation is an undesirable consequence of the British need to defend its Empire against threats from France and Russia. They also played down the impact of the Anglo-German Anglo-German Weltpolitik and Anglo, which ended in 1911.
Britain and France signed a series of agreements in 1904, which came to be known as Entente Cordiale. The most important feature of the treaty is that it gives freedom of action to Britain in Egypt and to France in Morocco. Equally, the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention is the common name used for the Convention between Great Britain and Russia relating to Persia, Afghanistan, and Tibet. The convention brings faltering British-Russian relations to the forefront by establishing boundaries that identify their respective controls in Persia, Afghanistan and Tibet.
The alignment between England, France and Russia is known as Triple Entente. Therefore, the Triple Entente is not understood as a counterweight to the Alliance of Three, but rather as a formula for securing the security of the empire between these three forces. The impact of the Triple Entente therefore doubles, to improve English relations with France and its Russian allies and to degrade the importance of British good relations with Germany. Clark declared it "is not the antagonism of Germany causing isolation, but rather that the new system itself channeled and increased hostility towards the German Empire."
Imperial Opportunity: Italy - Ottoman
The Italo-Turkish War of 1911-12 took place between the Ottoman Empire and the Italian Empire in North Africa. The significance for the First World War was that this war made it clear that no Great Power seemed to want to support the Ottoman Empire any longer and this paved the way for the Balkan Wars.
Imperial French Opportunity - North Africa
Morocco's status has been guaranteed by international treaties, and when France attempted to expand its influence there without the consent of all other signatories, Germany opposed it by encouraging the Moroccan Crisis, Tangier Crisis of 1905 and the Agadir Crisis of 1911. German policy intent was to push the wedge between England and France, but in both cases produce the opposite effect and Germany is diplomatically isolated, especially lacking the support of Italy despite Italy's membership in Alliance Three. The French Protectorate of Morocco was officially established in 1912.
In 1914, however, the African scene was peaceful. The continent is almost completely divided by imperial powers (with only Liberia and Ethiopia still independent). There was no major dispute there that pitted the two European powers against each other.
Marxist interpretation
Marxists usually associate the start of war with imperialism. "Imperialism," argued Lenin, "is the monopoly stage of capitalism." He thinks the monopoly capitalists go to war to control the market and raw materials.
Social Darwinism
Social Darwinism is a theory of human evolution loosely based on Darwinism affecting most of European intellectuals and strategic thinkers in the 1870-1914 era. These theories emphasize that the struggle between nations and "race" is natural and that only the most proper nation deserves to survive. It provides a boost to German assertiveness as a world economic and military power, aiming to compete with France and Britain for world powers. The German colonial government in Africa 1884-1914 was an expression of nationalism and moral superiority justified by establishing the image of the indigenous people as "Other". This approach highlights the racist view of mankind. German colonization is characterized by the use of repressive violence in the name of 'culture' and 'civilization'. The German cultural-missionary project boasts that its colonial program is a humanitarian and educational endeavor. Furthermore, widespread acceptance among intellectuals of social Darwinism justifies Germany's right to acquire colonial territory as the most appropriate 'survival issue', according to historian Michael Schubert.
This model suggests an explanation of why some ethnic groups (called "races" at the time) are very antagonistic for a long time, like Germany and Slavs. They are natural rivals, who are destined to fight. Senior German generals such as Helmuth von Moltke speak in apocalyptic terms about the need for Germany to fight for their existence as people and culture. MacMillan states: "Reflecting Social Darwinist theories of the time, many Germans saw Slavs, especially Russia as opposed to the natural Teutonic races." Social Darwinism expanded to Austria, where Conrad, the Austro-Hungarian General Chief of Staff stated: "The people who put their weapons cover their fate." In July 1914 the Austrian press described Serbia and Southern Slavs in terns who owe much to Social Darwinism.
War is seen as a natural and feasible or even useful policy instrument. "War is compared to a tonic for a sick patient or a life-saving operation to cut a sick meat". Since war is natural for some leaders, it is only a matter of time, and therefore it would be better to fight when circumstances are where the most steep. "I consider war unavoidable," Moltke said in 1912, "The sooner the better."
Nationalism makes war of competition between people, nations or races rather than kings and elites. Social Darwinism brings a sense of inevitability to the conflict and belittles the use of diplomacy or international treaties to end the war. It tends to glorify warfare, take the initiative and the role of the men of warriors.
Social Darwinism played an important role throughout Europe, but J. Leslie argued that it played an important and immediate role in the strategic thinking of some important and hawkish members of the Austro-Hungarian government. Social Darwinism thus normalizes war as a policy instrument and justifies its use.
Web alliance
The general narrative of war tends to emphasize the importance of the Alliance in binding great powers to action in crisis events such as the July crisis. Historians like Margaret MacMillan warned against the argument that the alliance forces a major force to act as they did during the July crisis. MacMillan states: "What we consider to be a permanent alliance before the First World War is not the same thing: they are much looser, much more porous, much more capable of changing."
The most important alliances in Europe require participants to agree on collective defense if attacked. Some of them represent formal alliances while Triple Entente represents only a frame of mind. These include:
- German-Austrian agreement (1879) or Dual Alliance
- The Franco-Russian Alliance (1894)
- The addition of Italy to Germany and the Austrian alliance in 1882, forming a "Triple Alliance".
- The London Agreement, 1839, guarantees Belgian neutrality
There are three exceptions indicating that an alliance does not necessarily force a major force to act: The "Entente Cordiale" between England and France in 1905 included a secret treaty leaving the northern coast of France and the Channel to be maintained by the British navy alone, and the separate "entente" between Britain and Russia (1907) so-called Triple Entente. However, the Three Entente between Russia, France and Britain did not force Great Britain to mobilize because it was not a military treaty.
The arms race
In the 1870s or 1880s all the great powers were preparing for a large-scale war, though none was expected. Britain focused on building its Royal Navy, which was already stronger than the combined two subsequent navies. Germany, France, Austria, Italy and Russia, and some smaller countries, set up a compulsory military system where youth will serve from 1 to 3 years in the army, then spend the next 20 years or more in reserve with annual summer training. Men from higher social status become officers. Each country designs a mobilization system in which the backup can be called quickly and sent to key points by train. Every year p
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